SJ Quinney College of Law, University of Utah

Utah Law Digital Commons
Utah Law Faculty Scholarship

Utah Law Scholarship

9-2018

The Effect of FRAND Commitments on Patent
Remedies
Jorge L. Contreras
S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah, jorge.contreras@law.utah.edu

Thomas F. Cotter
University of Minnesota Law School

Sang Jo Jong
Seoul National University College of Law

Brian J. Love
Santa Clara University School of Law

Nicolas Petit
University of Liege - School of Law; Hoover Institution; University of South Australia School of Law
See next page for additional authors

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.utah.edu/scholarship
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Contreras, Jorge L.; Cotter, Thomas F.; Jong, Sang Jo; Love, Brian J.; Petit, Nicolas; Picht, Peter George; Siebrasse, Norman; Sikorski,
Rafał; Suzuki, Masabumi; and de Werra, Jacques, "The Effect of FRAND Commitments on Patent Remedies" (2018). Utah Law
Faculty Scholarship. 130.
https://dc.law.utah.edu/scholarship/130

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Utah Law Scholarship at Utah Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Utah Law Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Utah Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
valeri.craigle@law.utah.edu.

Authors

Jorge L. Contreras, Thomas F. Cotter, Sang Jo Jong, Brian J. Love, Nicolas Petit, Peter George Picht, Norman
Siebrasse, Rafał Sikorski, Masabumi Suzuki, and Jacques de Werra

This book chapter is available at Utah Law Digital Commons: https://dc.law.utah.edu/scholarship/130

CHAPTER 5: THE EFFECT OF FRAND COMMITMENTS ON PATENT REMEDIES

Jorge L. Contreras, Thomas F. Cotter, Sang Jo Jong, Brian J. Love, Nicolas Petit, Peter Picht,
Norman V. Siebrasse, Rafal Sikorski, Masabumi Suzuki, Jacques de Werra
Forthcoming in PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS: TOWARD A GLOBAL CONSENSUS *
(Brad Biddle, Jorge L. Contreras, Brian J. Love, and Norman V. Siebrasse, eds., Cambridge University Press)

Table of Contents
I.

Introduction

287

II.

FRAND Commitments and Monetary Patent Damages

289

A.

United States

290

1.

Reasonable Royalty

290

2.

Enhanced Damages

293

B.

European Union - Applicability of Huawei v. ZTE to Monetary remedies

296

C.

National Damages Laws

298

D.

Discussion and Analysis: Monetary Damages and FRAND

299

FRAND Commitments and Injunctive Relief

307

A.

United States

307

B.

European Union

315

III.

1.

Huawei v. ZTE - Procedure

316

2.

Cases Interpreting Huawei v ZTE

318

*

This project was made possible by a gift from Intel Corporation to the Center for Law, Science & Innovation at the
Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law at Arizona State University.

285

a)

Response by Implementer

319

b)

Content of Infringement Notification

320

c)

Licensing offer

322

d)

Calculation of Royalties

324

e)

Portfolio Licenses

325

f)

Response by Implementer – timing and content

327

3.

Other European Law Principles

329

4.

Injunctions and Alternative Dispute Resolution in Europe

330

C.

Korea

331

D.

Japan

333

E.

China

336

F.

Discussion and Analysis: FRAND and Injunctions

337

Appendix - National Law Considerations for Monetary FRAND Damages

343

A.

Germany

343

B.

Switzerland

347

1.

Legal Status of FRAND Commitments under Swiss Law

347

2.

Patent Damages under Swiss Law

352

C.

Korea

358

D.

Japan

359

E.

China

360

286

Abstract: This chapter addresses a special category of cases in which an asserted patent is, or has
been declared to be, essential to the implementation of a collaboratively-developed voluntary
consensus standard, and the holder of that patent has agreed to license it to implementers of the
standard on terms that are fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND). In this chapter, we
explore how the existence of such a FRAND commitment may affect a patent holder’s entitlement
to monetary damages and injunctive relief. In addition to issues of patent law, remedies law and
contract law, we consider the effect of competition law on this issue.

I.

Introduction

The rules and policies of many standards-development organizations (SDOs) require SDO
participants to offer to license patents that are essential to the SDO’s standards (standards-essential
patents or SEPs) on terms that are “fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory” (FRAND). This
requirement is generally viewed as creating a binding obligation on the patent holder to offer or
grant such licenses, though the precise content of that obligation may not be consistent across
jurisdictions or SDOs. It is sometimes the case, however, that despite the existence of a FRAND
obligation, the holder of a SEP and the manufacturer, seller, or user of a standardized product (an
“implementer”) do not enter into a license agreement, thereby causing the product to infringe the
SEP. In such cases, if the parties cannot resolve their dispute privately, questions of legal liability
and remedies arise.
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The complex set of questions concerning the imposition of duties and liability for alleged
breaches of FRAND commitments is beyond the scope of this chapter. We cover certain aspects,
such as potential antitrust or competition law liability relating to such breaches in Chapter 6. Here,
we focus instead on the remedies that may be awarded once such liability is established. Such
liability may be found either (or both) with respect to the SEP holder’s failure to offer or grant a
license on FRAND terms to the implementer, and/or the implementer’s infringement of the SEPs
prior to the SEP holder’s granting of a license.
Assuming that liability is established, potential remedies for FRAND violations or patent
infringement include monetary damages, specific performance, and injunctive relief. Monetary
damages typically take the form of compensatory damages 1 paid by the implementer to the SEP
holder for past infringement (i.e., the implementer’s use of the patented technology prior to the
issuance of a license), as well as enhanced damages under certain circumstances. 2 In return,
implementers may seek specific performance requiring the SEP holder to grant a license
complying with the relevant FRAND conditions, as well as monetary damages to compensate for
the SEP holder’s breach of its FRAND commitment. 3 In addition, a SEP holder may pursue
injunctive relief of its own to prevent an implementer from continuing to infringe until a license is
granted.

1

See Chapters 1 and 2.

2

See Chapter 3.

3

For example, in Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc. (9th Cir. 2015) (U.S.), Microsoft was able to collect approximately

$15 million in damages for Motorola’s breach of its FRAND commitment which were primarily attributable to the
costs Microsoft incurred in moving a facility out of Germany.
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Because specific performance is contractual or pseudo-contractual in nature and thus
focuses primarily on the terms of the SEP holder’s FRAND commitment, we consider it beyond
the scope of this project. We ask instead what effect, if any, the existence of a prior FRAND
commitment should have on the patent law remedies that a SEP holder might otherwise be able to
obtain from an infringer.

II.

FRAND Commitments and Monetary Patent Damages

In general, a patent holder is entitled to monetary compensation when its patent is
infringed. As described in the preceding chapters, the measure of damages varies from country to
country. In this section we first consider whether a FRAND commitment affects the level of
monetary damages to which a SEP holder is entitled when an unlicensed implementer infringes
the SEP, as compared with an award of damages assessed on general patent law principles. For
example, is the “reasonable” in FRAND the same as the “reasonable” in reasonable royalty
damages awarded by U.S. courts? A related question is whether the existence of a FRAND
commitment precludes a monetary award based on lost profits, or a disgorgement of infringer
profits, which might be available in the absence of a FRAND commitment, particularly in
jurisdictions that do not base patent damages on the award of a reasonable royalty. We begin by
surveying the applicable law in the U.S. and EU, and then make recommendations.
We do not address the question whether an award of “reasonable” royalties to the holder
of an infringed SEP who has not made a FRAND commitment should equate to “reasonable”
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royalties awarded to a SEP holder that has made a FRAND commitment. The question of how to
treat such SDO “outsiders” is beyond the scope of this chapter. 4

A.

United States

1.

Reasonable Royalty

As discussed in Chapter 1, in the U.S. the primary statutory measure of damages for patent
infringement is a “reasonable royalty.” 5 As a result, several U.S. courts that have calculated
FRAND royalty rates for SEPs have looked to traditional methodologies for determining
reasonable royalty damages.
For the past several decades, the calculation of reasonable royalty damages in the U.S. has
generally followed the 15-factor “bottom-up” methodology 6 introduced in Georgia-Pacific Corp.
v. U.S. Plywood Corp. 7 However, because this framework assumes that the patent holder and the

4

For a discussion of the extent to which outsiders enforce SEPs, see Contreras 2016; Rembrandt Wireless Tech., LP

v. Samsung Elects. Co., Ltd. (E.D. Tex. 2016) (U.S.) (awarding reasonable royalty damages to a holder of SEPs
covering the Bluetooth standard, even though SDO participants who developed the standard committed to grant
licenses on a royalty-free basis); CSIRO v. Cisco Sys., Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2015) (U.S.) (awarding “reasonable royalty”
damages to SEP holder that did not make a FRAND commitment).

5

U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 284.

6

For a discussion of bottom-up versus top-down royalty calculation methodologies, see Section D below.

7

Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp. (S.D.N.Y. 1970, p.1120) (U.S.). See Chapter 1.
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infringer have no pre-existing relationship or duty toward one another, many of the assumptions
underlying this analysis do not hold in cases involving FRAND-encumbered SEPs. This
disconnect has been pointed out in several cases including Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc. and
Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys. In Microsoft, the court expressly modified twelve of the fifteen factors
as follows:

(i)

The lack of comparability of negotiated royalty terms that fail to account for

RAND obligations. (Factors 1 and 12);
(ii)

The importance of the value of the patented technology apart from the value

associated with incorporation of the patented technology into the standard. (Factors 6, 8,
10, 11 and 13);
(iii)

The importance of alternatives that could have been written into the standard

instead of the patented technology, with the focus on the period before the standard was
adopted and implemented. (Factor 9);
(iv)

The purpose of the RAND commitment to encourage widespread adoption of the

standard through avoidance of holdup and stacking. (Factor 15);
(v)

The irrelevance of some of the factors because they do not relate to the RAND

context (e.g., whether patentee has a policy to license others, relationship of the licensor
and licensee, and the patent term). (Factors 4, 5, and 7) 8

8

Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc. (W.D. Wash. 2013, ¶¶ 99-110) (U.S.).
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In Ericsson, the Federal Circuit noted several respects in which the Georgia-Pacific factors
were both irrelevant and contrary to the RAND commitment under consideration. 9 Thus, as the
lower court did in Microsoft, the Federal Circuit criticized the use of Georgia-Pacific Factors 4, 5,
8, 9, and 10 when considering royalties subject to a RAND commitment. 10 Though the court did
not hold that a modified version of the Georgia-Pacific factors must always be used in cases
involving SEPs, it found that the combination of errors in the lower court’s instructions to the jury
was significant enough to warrant remand. 11
These changes suggest that the Georgia-Pacific framework, as originally conceived, is not
well-suited to the determination of FRAND royalty levels. 12 Moreover, there appears to be nothing
in U.S. law that compels courts to utilize either the Georgia-Pacific framework, or patent damages
law in general, to determine royalties complying with a SEP holder’s FRAND commitment.
What’s more, the inconsistent and ad hoc application of the Georgia-Pacific factors to different
FRAND royalty calculations has led to significantly different outcomes in different courts in the
United States, even in cases concerning the same technical feature of a single standard. 13

9

Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys. (Fed. Cir. 2014, p.1230-32) (U.S.)

10

Id.

11

Id. at 1235.

12

Nor, as argued in Chapter 1, in the general damages context either.

13

See Bartlett & Contreras 2017 (discussing five different U.S. decisions arriving at divergent FRAND royalty rates

for aspects of the IEEE Wi-Fi standard).
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2.

Enhanced Damages

As discussed in Chapter 3, another important element of U.S. patent damages law is the
availability of “enhanced” (i.e., up to treble) damages when infringement is found to have been
willful. The standard for willfulness supporting an award of enhanced damages has recently been
clarified, and somewhat liberalized, by the U.S. Supreme Court in Halo Elecs. v. Pulse Elecs. 14 It
is currently debated whether a manufacturer’s implementation of a technical standard in a product
without a license from the holder of a FRAND-encumbered SEP should be considered willful if
the SEP is, indeed, infringed. On one hand, the manufacturer is clearly aware of the standard and,
in many cases, the patents declared to be essential to the standard are listed in a public database.
What’s more, the manufacturer may even have received a notification of the patent from the patent
holder. These factors might weigh in favor of a finding that the manufacturer’s infringement was
willful. 15 But on the other hand, independent analysts have determined that a large number of
patents declared to be essential to various standards are not, in their view, actually essential, 16 and
obtaining a reliable legal opinion (see Ch. 3) regarding which among hundreds or thousands of
patents listed in a public database are essential to a standard is likely prohibitive in terms of cost
and time. Moreover, even patents that are essential to a standard are sometimes found to be invalid

14

Halo Elec., Inc. v. Pulse Elec., Inc. (U.S. 2016) (U.S.).

15

See Sidak 2016b, 1109-12 (discussing criteria for enhanced damages in the context of SEPs).

16

For example, Goodman & Myers 2005, Fairfield 2007, and Fairfield 2010 found that only 27, 28 and 50 percent of

patent families declared as “essential” to ETSI’s GSM, WCDMA and LTE standards, respectively, were actually
essential to implementation of those standards.
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or not infringed by a particular product implementing the standard. 17 These factors tend to weigh
against a finding of willfulness with respect to the infringement of SEPs by standard implementers.
However, even if weighing strongly against a finding of willfulness, it is not clear that such factors
should amount to a categorical exclusion of enhanced damages in the case of SEP infringement. 18
To date, we are aware of only one U.S district court decision enhancing damages for the
infringement of SEPs. 19 However, at least one member of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has acknowledged their potential availability, at least when a potential licensee has
negotiated in bad faith. 20
Beyond the threshold question whether enhanced damages may be available for the

17

See, e.g., Netgear, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 16, 2018), p.86 (reporting that the three patent claims

covering 3G wireless telecom standards that were found to be infringed by a jury in Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys. (E.D.
Tex 2013) (U.S.), aff’d (Fed. Cir. 2014) (U.S.) were subsequently found by the PTAB to be invalid in a series of 2015
inter partes review proceedings that were subsequently affirmed by the Federal Circuit in 2017).
18

See Sidak 2016b, 1105-07 (arguing that a FRAND commitment should not per se foreclose the possibility of

enhanced damages in SEP infringement cases).

19

See Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics, Inc. (E.D. Tex. 2016, p.2) (U.S.) (court enhanced damages

by 20% following jury finding of willful infringement). See also Sidak 2016b, 1101-02 (discussing case).

20

The prospect of enhanced damages for the intentional violation of a FRAND commitment has been noted by Chief

Judge Prost of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, who wrote in the context of a dispute over the issuance
of an injunction for SEPs, that “if a trial court believes that an infringer previously engaged in bad faith negotiations,
it is entitled to increase the damages to account for any harm to the patentee as a result of that behavior.” Apple, Inc.
v. Motorola, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2014, p.1342) (U.S.) (Prost, J., concurring). For additional discussion of relevant literature,
see Chapter 7 n.177.
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infringement of SEPs is a further question regarding the ways that the availability of enhanced
damages may affect the conduct of parties in the standardization environment.

As noted above,

the standard measure of damages for patent infringement in the U.S. is a “reasonable royalty.” A
“reasonable” royalty is also what is required to be paid under a FRAND commitment. Thus, an
opportunistic manufacturer of standardized products could decide that the most efficient course of
action is not to seek a FRAND license from a SEP holder at all, but instead to delay until it is sued
for infringement, at which point its maximum liability (assuming that both patent validity and
infringement are established) would only be the FRAND royalty it otherwise would have paid ex
ante. As discussed elsewhere, this form of conduct by standards implementers has been termed
“hold out.” 21
The availability of enhanced damages (in addition to awards of attorney’s fees and preand post-judgment interest) could change a standard implementer’s calculus somewhat. That is,
if the implementer willfully infringes SEPs under the relevant legal standards and refuses to pay
royalties under a FRAND license offered by the SEP holder, then enhanced damages may be
awarded in an eventual infringement suit by the SEP holder. If so, the cost of holding out could
far exceed the FRAND royalty that would originally have been payable. Accordingly, the
availability of enhanced damages, at least in the U.S., could reduce the risk that opportunistic
standards implementers will hold out and refuse to pay FRAND royalties that are legitimately due.

21

This is sometimes also referred to as the “catch-me-if-you-can” problem: for more discussion, see Chapters 3 and

7.
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B.

European Union - Applicability of Huawei v. ZTE to Monetary remedies

As discussed in Chapter 6 and in Part III below, the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU) in Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd. v. ZTE Corp. lays out a procedure that a SEP holder must follow
in order to avoid committing an abuse of its dominant position under Article 102 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) when it seeks an injunction to prevent
infringement of a SEP. The CJEU’s decision in Huawei, however, does not explicitly address the
issue of monetary damages. In fact, the CJEU states in Huawei that Article 102 of the TFEU does
not prohibit a SEP holder “from bringing an action for infringement against the alleged infringer
of its SEP and seeking the rendering of accounts in relation to past acts of use of that SEP or an
award of damages in respect of those acts of use.” 22 This suggestion has been followed in
subsequent decisions rendered by German courts. In NTT DoCoMo v. HTC, for instance, the
Mannheim District Court noted that a SEP holder that has made a FRAND commitment must
follow the Huawei rules of conduct only with regard to an action for injunction or the recall of
products. It is, however, free to bring an action seeking monetary remedies in relation to past acts
of infringement. 23 Comparable statements regarding the rules of conduct derived from Huawei v.
ZTE were made by the Mannheim court in Pioneer v. Acer 24 and Philips v. Archos 25 and by the

22

Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd. v. ZTE Corp. (CJEU 2015, ¶ 76) (EU).

23

LG Mannheim v. 29.1.2016 – 7 O 66/15 – NTT DoCoMo v. HTC, ¶ II, 1 (Ger.).

24

LG Mannheim v. 8.1.2016 – 7 O 96/14 – Pioneer v. Acer, ¶ 79 (Ger.).

25

LG Mannheim v. 1.7.2016 – 7 O 209/15 – Philips v. Archos, ¶ III, IV, 1 (Ger.).
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Düsseldorf District Court in Unwired Planet v. Samsung. 26 Accordingly, a SEP holder does not
commit an abuse under Article 102 of the TFEU even if it brings an action for damages without
having notified the implementer of an infringement and without having offered it a FRAND
license.
This said, the obligations developed by the CJEU in Huawei v. ZTE do have an indirect
impact on the extent to which damages and the rendering of accounts are due. Where the SEP
holder fails to grant a FRAND license although it has made a FRAND commitment and the
implementer has expressed its readiness to take a license, damages are limited to the FRAND
royalty level (presumably excluding other forms of damages such as lost profits and disgorgement
of infringer’s profits) but only for the period after the SEP holder’s abusive refusal to license. 27
Claims for information and the rendering of accounts must, in this event, be limited to what is
necessary for determining these FRAND-based damages. 28
What’s more, implementers of standards who have been refused a license in violation of a
SEP holder’s FRAND commitment may themselves be entitled to monetary damages under some
interpretations of these cases. 29 Though this theory has not yet been tested in court, such claims
could be similar to U.S. breach of contract claims that have been brought successfully against SEP
holders in cases such as Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc. Moreover, it is possible that if a

26

LG Düsseldorf v. 19.1.2016 – 4b O 120/14 – Unwired Planet v. Samsung, ¶ VII, 6, b, aa, bb (Ger.).

27

Id. at ¶ VII, 6, b, dd.

28

Id. at ¶ VII, 6, b, ee.

29

LG Düsseldorf v. 19.1.2016 – 4b O 120/14 – Unwired Planet v. Samsung, ¶ 353 (Ger.); LG Düsseldorf v. 19.1.2016

– 4b O 122/14 – Unwired Planet v. Samsung, ¶ 370 (Ger.); Picht 2018, 42.
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standards implementer fails to comply with the procedures outlined in Huawei v. ZTE, a SEP
holder, without violating Article 102 of the TFEU, may be permitted to seek damages in excess of
reasonable royalties, including lost profits or disgorgement of the infringer’s profits. 30

C.

National Damages Laws

The courts of every country will, in general, evaluate claims for FRAND damages in view
of its national rules and precedents regarding contractual interpretation and remedies. A full
discussion of the rules of every country is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, in the
Appendix we provide a discussion of several exemplary countries (Germany, Switzerland, Korea,
Japan and China) for illustrative purposes. It is important to note however, that while we discuss
the potential impact of FRAND commitments on monetary patent damages under a variety of
national laws, we do not necessarily believe that FRAND royalties negotiated under global license
agreements, which are increasingly viewed as the norm, 31 should specify royalties on a countryby-country basis, or that the interpretation of FRAND under the policy of a particular SDO should
vary based on the patent damages laws of the country in which parties to a dispute may adjudicate
the level of FRAND royalties. 32

30

See id. at ¶ VII, 6, b, cc, dd.

31

See, e.g., Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. (Pat 2017) (UK); TCL Commc’ns Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v.

Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (C.D. Cal. 2017) (U.S.). For a discussion of issues surrounding national versus
global FRAND licensing, see Contreras 2017b.

32

See Teece et al. 2012, 34 (“[T]o suggest that RAND-reasonable is to be interpreted in accordance with the vagaries

of different countries’ patent infringement damages law could make what is and what is not RAND-reasonable
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D.

Discussion and Analysis: Monetary Damages and FRAND

The fact that courts in the U.S. have chosen to determine FRAND royalty rates using the
methodology of patent damages calculations (including the Georgia-Pacific framework) is, most
likely, the result of the fact that the term “reasonable royalty” is used in both the U.S. Patent Act
and the SDO policies establishing FRAND commitments. Yet these two concepts (patent damages
and FRAND royalty rates) arose via different historical pathways 33 and are intended to achieve
different goals. FRAND royalty rates are created through private agreements among SEP holders
and SDOs, or public promises made by SEP holders in the marketplace. As pointed out in Chapter
1, in the vast number of license agreements made outside the shadow of litigation, royalty rates
are not determined using the analytical framework that courts employ to calculate damages in
litigation. No SDOs of which we are aware have pointed to the Georgia-Pacific framework, or

different from country to country”). This being said, recent cases have appropriately (if imperfectly) attempted to
adjust determined FRAND royalty rates based on varying market factors, patent coverage and patent strength in
different regions of the world (e.g., U.S./Europe v. China and so-called minor markets). See, e.g., Unwired Planet
Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. (Pat 2017) (UK); TCL Commc’ns Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM
Ericsson (C.D. Cal. 2017) (U.S.).
33

The historical origins of modern FRAND commitments in the U.S. can be traced to a series of antitrust remedial

orders entered from the 1940s to the 1970s which required that patent holders found to have engaged in anticompetitive
conduct make licenses to those patents available on terms that were “reasonable.” This language was later adopted by
ANSI and other SDOs around the world. See Contreras 2015b.
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patent damages analysis in general, as guideposts for determining FRAND rates. 34 To the extent
that SDO participants have suggested FRAND rates for different standards, these rates have been
developed based on industry norms and market factors, 35 rather than the hypothetical negotiation
framework mandated under Georgia-Pacific. 36
But because the term “reasonable” is used in these two different contexts – patent damages
and FRAND licenses – the temptation to recruit one (the extensive body of case precedent relating
to patent damages) for use when addressing the other (the proper level of FRAND royalties) has
proven too tempting to resist for U.S. courts. As a result, U.S. courts determining FRAND royalty
rates regularly invoke the case law and methodologies of reasonable royalty damages, including
the imperfect Georgia-Pacific framework and all of its baggage, when calculating a FRAND
royalty or instructing the jury in doing so, leading to an apparent convergence of contractual
FRAND damages and “reasonable royalty” patent infringement damages. 37
Outside of the U.S., where patent damages are not so closely tied to a “reasonable royalty”
there is less temptation for courts to tie FRAND royalties to patent damages calculations, though

34

See also Teece et al. 2012, 33-34 (“[W]e are not aware of any SSO that has explicitly announced that [RAND

royalties and ‘reasonable’ royalty patent damages] are intended to be synonymous.”).

35

See Contreras 2015a.

36

Chapter 1 critiques the Georgia-Pacific factors for the much the same reason in respect of reasonable royalty

determinations more generally.

37

See Contreras & Gilbert 2015 (observing this convergence but arguing that both FRAND royalty calculations and

the U.S. reasonable royalty damage framework should be revamped to focus on the “incremental value” of the patented
technology to the infringing product).
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this has on occasion occurred, for example, in Samsung v. Apple Japan. 38 In other jurisdictions
such as Korea, however, patent damages are based on the disgorgement of profits of the infringer,
which bear little relation to reasonable royalties. 39 To be sure, in the non-U.S. cases that have
resulted in written decisions concerning FRAND royalty determinations to date, none have made
reference to Georgia-Pacific or its fifteen-factor analytical framework.
The Georgia-Pacific framework supports what has been termed a “bottom up” approach
to calculating patent royalties. Under a bottom-up approach, royalties are determined case by case
depending on the determined value of the patents in suit, without significant regard for the value
of other patents that may cover the same technology or standard. Such approaches are discussed
in Chapter 1, both with and without application of the Georgia-Pacific framework.
One promising alternative to a bottom-up approach in the area of standards-essential
patents is what has been termed a “top-down” approach to determining FRAND royalties. Such
top-down mechanisms begin by determining the aggregate royalty burden associated with a
standard when considering the royalties owed to any particular patent holder. 40 As the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois noted in In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent
Litigation, “the determination of a [F]RAND royalty must address the risk of royalty stacking by
considering the aggregate royalties that would apply if other [SEP] holders made royalty demands

38

See Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Japan LLC (IP High Ct. 2014) (Japan).

39

See Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Korea Ltd. (Dist. Ct. 2012) (Kor.).

40

See Cotter 2018, 206-207 (discussing the Innovatio top-down analysis); Pentheroudakis & Baron 2017, 95-96

(analyzing top-down approaches in Innovatio and other cases); Bartlett & Contreras 2017 (discussing the benefits of
top-down approaches).
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of the implementer.” 41 Top-down approaches recognize that when multiple patents cover a single
standard, the rate charged by one SEP holder will necessarily affect the rates that the other SEP
holders are able to obtain from a single manufacturer. 42 Once an aggregate royalty is determined,
various methodologies can then be used to allocate that total among individual SEP holders. 43 As
explained by the European Commission in a recent communication, “an individual SEP cannot be
considered in isolation. Parties need to take into account a reasonable aggregate rate for the
standard, assessing the overall added value of the technology.” 44
Such a top-down approach was used by the Japanese IP High Court in Samsung v. Apple
Japan, which held that the aggregate royalty burden for the 3G UMTS standard should not exceed
5%, based on four public statements and informal agreements among industry participants relating

41

In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation (N.D. Ill. 2013, p.9) (U.S.) (internal quotes omitted). It is worth

noting that the specific top-down royalty approach used by the court in Innovatio, which was based on the deemed
profit of a hypothetical component supplier, was somewhat unusual and has not been followed by other courts, nor do
we endorse it.

42

See Lemley & Shapiro 2007a, 2011 (“[T]he royalty rate negotiated by one patent holder is affected by the rates the

downstream firm pays to other patent holders, so a proper analysis must account for the joint determination of all the
royalty rates.”).

43

Allocation methodologies, while critical to the determination of FRAND royalties, are subject to an extensive

literature, a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this chapter. See generally Bartlett & Contreras 2017, 208-09
(cataloging a range of patent valuation and allocation methodologies, including numerical proportionality/headcount,
citation count, cost recovery, real option value, substitute cost, footprint, discounted cash flow and comparable license
analysis).
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European Commission, COM (2017) 712 final.
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to the standard. 45 The court then allocated a portion of this total royalty to Samsung’s asserted
UMTS-essential patent based on the total number of SEPs likely to be essential to the standard. 46
The English Patents Court used two methods to calculate a FRAND royalty in Unwired
Planet v. Huawei: 47 one based on comparable licenses and one (used to check the former result)
based on a top-down methodology similar to that of the Japanese IP High Court in Samsung v.
Apple Japan In Unwired Planet, the court determined the aggregate royalty attributable to a
standard under all applicable SEPs and then allocated an appropriate amount to the SEP holder
asserting the patents in suit. Under the court’s top-down methodology, the FRAND royalty was
calculated as the aggregate SEP royalty burden of a particular standard on a product (e.g., the
portion of a smartphone’s price that is attributable to the 4G standard) multiplied by the percentage
of 4G SEPs held by the plaintiff. 48 To calculate the aggregate royalty burden attributable to the
various standards in suit, the court considered public statements made by other holders of SEPs
with respect to royalties on those standards. 49 It then calculated the plaintiff’s share of the total

45

Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Japan LLC (IP High Ct. 2014, p.131) (Japan) (FRAND I).

46

Id. at 132, 137-38 (noting that out of 1889 patent families declared as essential to UMTS, an independent research

report issued by Fairfield Resources International, Inc. found that only 529 of these patent families “are or are likely
to be essential” to the standard. Accordingly, the court based the royalty due to Samsung on a total pool of 529, rather
than 1889, SEP families). For a more detailed discussion of the methodology, see Siebrasse & Cotter 2017b, 384-85.
47

Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. (Pat 2017) (UK).

48

Id. at ¶ 178.

49

Id. at ¶¶ 264-272. While such statements are not ideal data points on which to base aggregate royalty determinations

and can be, as the court acknowledged, both unreliable and self-serving, they are, to date, the most useful data
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SEP pool, using a variety of counting and filtering methodologies, including a filter for the likely
essentiality of the patents in the asserted portfolio. 50 The result calculated by the court was
consistent with the result that it obtained using a methodology based on comparable licenses.
Top-down approaches can avoid both the potential inconsistencies associated with ad hoc
adaptations of damages frameworks such as Georgia-Pacific and contrast with other “bottom-up”
royalty approaches, in which royalties due to individual patent holders are determined
independently of one another, whereby the total royalty burden emerges only as the sum of its
individual components. 51 Courts applying bottom-up approaches have used different royalty
calculation criteria and factors on a case-by-case basis, even when patents covering the same
features of the same standard have been involved, thus yielding inconsistent and potentially
excessive results. 52 For example, in 2013 and 2014, five different U.S. district courts, either in
bench trials or through a jury, calculated royalties for a total of thirty-five SEPs covering Wi-Fi
standards. The aggregate royalty for these thirty-five patents amounted to approximately 4.5% of
the total sale price of a typical $50 Wi-Fi router. 53 Yet it has been estimated that there are

available. But see Contreras 2017a (suggesting that joint negotiation of such rates within SDOs would yield better
data on which to base such determinations).

50

Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. (Pat 2017, ¶¶ 325-29) (UK). For a more detailed discussion of the

methodology, see Siebrasse & Cotter 2017b, 384-86.

51

See Bartlett & Contreras 2017, 293-95 (discussing and providing examples of bottom-up calculations).

52

See id. at 295-96 and Table 2.

53

Id.
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approximately 3,000 patents covering the Wi-Fi standard, 54 nearly one hundred times the number
subject to adjudication thus far. Were the royalty for each of these patents to be calculated in a
similarly uncoordinated, bottom-up manner, the aggregate patent royalty on a Wi-Fi router could
easily surpass the product’s total selling price by an order of magnitude or more.
This being said, implementing top-down approaches is not without its challenges and
practical difficulties. Most notably, there is not yet a uniformly accepted methodology for
determining the aggregate royalty level for all patents covering a particular standard. In the Apple
Japan and Unwired Planet cases discussed above, the courts relied on public statements made by
SEP holders, statements that at least one court acknowledged to be of limited reliability and
manifestly “self-serving.” 55 What’s more, even once an aggregate royalty for all patents covering
a standard is determined, a methodology must be developed to allocate that aggregate royalty
among the many different holders of SEPs covering that standard. In most cases to date, courts
using top-down methodologies have simply allocated the aggregate royalty among SEP holders on

54

In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation (N.D. Ill. 2013, p.41) (U.S.).

55

Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. (Pat 2017) (UK). See also TCL Commc’ns Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v.

Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (C.D. Cal. 2017) (U.S.) (court similarly relying on public statements); Contreras
2017a (discussing methodologies for aggregate royalty determination). This being said, unlike patents other than
SEPs, such public statements do exist in the context of SEPs, at least giving some indication what relevant parties
have concluded about aggregate value. In In re Innovatio the court relied on the profit margin on the smallest salable
patent practicing unit: for a discussion and critique, see Siebrasse and Cotter 2017b, 381-82 who suggest that the
methodology used in Innovatio was flawed in various respects.
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a simple “numerical proportionality” or one-patent-one-share basis. 56 While this methodology is
easily applied, it overlooks inherent value differences among patents such as those identified in
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.
More broadly, while in principle a top-down methodology has several attractive features
as compared with a bottom up approach, its application to a given case is only as good as the
available evidence. Because the top-down and bottom-up approaches rely on different types of
evidence, one or the other might be preferable in a particular case, given the evidence at hand.
For the foregoing reasons, we recommend that (1) consistent with the recommendations
in Chapter 1, courts assessing FRAND royalty rates, particularly outside the United States, reject
strict application of the Georgia-Pacific fifteen-factor hypothetical negotiation framework when
making that assessment, and (2) courts assessing FRAND royalty rates select a methodology for
calculating these rates that is best supported by the available evidence, whether such evidence be
sufficiently comparable license agreements covering the same patents, or general consensus on
aggregate royalty rates for an overall standard or technology, and, if the evidence would support
using multiple approaches, to consider utilizing both bottom-up and top-down royalty calculation
methodologies and comparing the results. We also propose that further research be conducted
regarding suitable methodologies for determining the aggregate top-down royalty burden for
particular standards and for allocating aggregate royalties among individual holders of SEPs, with
the understanding that if a reliable method for determining such an aggregate royalty burden can
be developed, it would result in a desirable methodology for calculating FRAND royalty rates.

56

As Birss, J, noted in Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. (Pat 2017) (UK), “patent counting” may be

unavoidable when large numbers of patents are involved.
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Finally, we recognize that there may be a potential role for enhanced damages in deterring
intentional “hold out” conduct of a potential licensee, and thus propose that further research be
conducted regarding the potential deterrent effect of such damages on holdout behavior in the SEP
context. We take no position regarding the potential availability of patent damages in excess of
FRAND levels under German or EU case law.

III.

FRAND Commitments and Injunctive Relief

A.

United States

The judicial framework for injunctive relief in patent cases in the United States is set forth
in the Supreme Court of the United States’ 2006 decision in eBay v. MercExchange, which is
discussed at length in Chapter 4. Under eBay, a court considering whether to grant an injunction
to a SEP holder must balance four equitable factors: whether the SEP holder would suffer
irreparable harm absent issuance of the injunction, whether the SEP holder would adequately be
compensated by monetary damages, whether a balancing of interests of the parties favors granting
the injunction, and the effect of the injunction on the public interest.
In Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., Motorola sought an injunction to prevent Microsoft’s
continued infringement of Motorola’s patents covering two standards (IEEE’s 802.11 and ITU’s
H.264). The court found that Motorola made FRAND commitments with respect to these patents,
and that Microsoft agreed to accept a license on reasonable terms. The court evaluated these facts
in view of the four eBay factors and determined that Motorola did not suffer an irreparable injury
or show that monetary damages would be inadequate to compensate it for the infringement.
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Accordingly, the court denied Motorola’s request for an injunction. In Realtek Semiconductor
Corp. v. LSI Corp., 57 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California held that a SEP
holder breached its FRAND commitment by seeking injunctive relief against an implementer of a
standard before the patent holder offered a license to the implementer. Again, the injunction was
denied.
These district court decisions laid the groundwork for the Federal Circuit to consider the
issue of permanent injunctive relief in FRAND-related cases. In Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., the
Federal Circuit analyzed Motorola’s request for an injunction against the sale of Apple products
allegedly infringing Motorola’s FRAND-encumbered SEPs. 58 The trial judge denied Motorola’s
request, reasoning that a patent holder making a FRAND commitment, by definition, has
acknowledged that a monetary royalty would be adequate compensation for a license under the
patent, thereby eliminating any argument that the infringement would cause the patent holder
irreparable harm under eBay. 59
Though the Federal Circuit panel was divided on some issues, all three members of the
panel concurred that “[t]o the extent that the district court applied a per se rule that injunctions are
unavailable for SEPs, it erred.” 60 The court reasoned that the eBay framework “provides ample
strength and flexibility for analyzing FRAND committed patents and industry standards in

57

Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp. (N.D. Cal. 2014) (U.S.).

58

Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2014) (U.S.).

59

Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc. (N.D. Ill. 2012) (U.S.).

60

Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2014, p.1331) (U.S.).
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general,” and found no reason to create “a separate rule or analytical framework for addressing
injunctions for FRAND-committed patents.” 61 The court acknowledged that under the eBay
framework, “a patentee subject to FRAND commitments may have difficulty establishing
irreparable harm.” 62 Nevertheless, “an injunction may be justified where an infringer unilaterally
refuses a FRAND royalty or unreasonably delays negotiations to the same effect.” 63 With this in
mind, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of Motorola’s request for an
injunction. 64
Chief Judge Rader, dissenting-in-part, argued that a genuine issue of material fact existed
regarding Apple’s conduct with respect to the acceptance of a FRAND license from Motorola (i.e.,
potential holdout) and that the case should have been remanded for further fact finding on this
issue. 65 In sharp contrast, Judge Prost, concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part, disagreed with

61

Id. at 1331-32.

62

Id. at 1332.

63

Id. (citing DOJ & USPTO 2013). As discussed above in Part II.A.2, this phenomenon is known as “holdout” or

“reverse holdup” and is said to occur when an infringer refuses in bad faith to accept the FRAND license terms offered
by a SEP holder.

64

Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2014, p.1332) (U.S.). Interestingly, even though Apple v. Motorola did not

involve antitrust issues (and despite the fact fact that the Department of Justice (DOJ) is required to uphold the law as
it is fashioned by the courts of the United States), in 2017 the head of the DOJ’s Antitrust Division sharply critiqued
the Federal Circuit’s reasoning in Apple v. Motorola, implying that it transformed FRAND commitments into a
“compulsory licensing scheme.” Delrahim 2017.
65

Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.. at 1333-34.
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the majority’s suggestion that an alleged infringer’s refusal to negotiate a license could ever serve
as a basis for issuing an injunction on a FRAND-encumbered patent. 66 She reasoned that while a
potential licensee’s bad faith negotiation might justify an award of enhanced damages (see
discussion above), the eBay “irreparable harm” test would nevertheless militate against granting
an injunction on a FRAND-encumbered patent. 67 However, Judge Prost conceded that an
injunction might be appropriate if the patentee were unable to collect the damages to which it was
entitled, for example, if the infringer refused to pay an adjudicated damage award or was beyond
the jurisdiction of the court. 68
The U.S. DOJ and FTC have also taken an interest in the propriety of parties bound by
FRAND commitments seeking injunctive relief. In 2011, the FTC issued guidelines specifying
that under eBay, injunctive relief might not always be justified in the FRAND context, writing that
“[a] prior [F]RAND commitment can provide strong evidence that denial of the injunction and
ongoing royalties will not irreparably harm the patentee.” 69 And in 2012, the DOJ approved three
large patent acquisition transactions only after the involved parties (Apple, Google, and Microsoft)
committed not to seek injunctions preventing the use of FRAND-encumbered SEPs. 70

66

Id. at 1342.

67

Id.

68

Id. at 1343.

69

FTC 2011, 235.

70

See Contreras 2012.
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In late 2012 and 2013, the FTC brought two actions under Section 5 of the FTC Act to
address suspected violations of FRAND commitments. 71 In the first such action, the FTC
investigated Robert Bosch GmbH in connection with its proposed acquisition of a firm called
SPX. 72 According to the complaint, SPX participated in an SDO developing standards for
automotive cooling systems. 73 Despite having made a FRAND commitment to the SDO, SPX
asserted two patents covering the SDO’s standards against suspected infringers and then sought
injunctive relief to prevent future sales of infringing products. 74 The FTC argued that SPX’s
attempt to obtain injunctive relief in the face of its FRAND commitment was inherently coercive
and oppressive, and thereby constituted an unfair method of competition in violation of Section 5.
Bosch settled the action by committing that SPX would no longer seek injunctive relief in this
context.
The FTC again took action to address a patent holder’s attempt to obtain injunctive relief
in the face of a prior FRAND commitment in Motorola Mobility LLC and Google, Inc. 75 In that
case, Motorola (later acquired by Google) held patents essential to practice standards promulgated
by IEEE, ITU, and ETSI. Motorola participated in, and made FRAND commitments to, each of

71

Under Section 5 of the FTC Act,15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1), the FTC may prosecute “unfair methods of competition” and

“unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”
72

In the Matter of Robert Bosch GmbH (FTC Apr. 23, 2013) (U.S.).

73

Id. at 715-19.

74

Id. at 718-19.

75

In the Matter of Motorola Mobility LLC and Google Inc. (FTC July 23, 2013) (Decision and Order)
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these SDOs. Nevertheless, in separate suits asserting these patents against Apple and Microsoft,
Motorola sought exclusion orders at the ITC and injunctions in federal court to prevent future sales
of standards-compliant products, even though both defendant implementers were allegedly willing
to acquire licenses to Motorola’s patents. The FTC asserted that Motorola’s attempt to enjoin sales
of Apple and Microsoft products using its standards-essential patents constituted an unfair method
of competition in violation of Section 5. 76 The dispute was settled after Google agreed not to seek
injunctive relief against an infringer of certain FRAND-committed patents unless the infringer was
beyond the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts, stated in writing that it would not accept a license of the
patent, refused to enter into a license agreement determined to meet the FRAND requirement by a
court or arbitrator, or failed to provide written confirmation of an offer of a FRAND license. 77
As discussed in Chapter 4, U.S. courts considering the issuance of an injunction must also
consider the potential effect of the injunction on the public interest. While public interest
considerations have not yet played a major role in the injunction analysis undertaken by courts
adjudicating FRAND disputes, the public interest has played a large role in certain SEP-related
proceedings before the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC), an independent federal
agency. Similar to a court’s power to issue an injunction to prevent future infringement of a patent
within the United States, the ITC has the authority to issue exclusion orders to prevent the
importation of infringing products into the United States. 78 In considering whether to grant such
an exclusion order, the ITC is required, among other things, to consider “the effect of such

76

Id. at 2-3.

77

Id. at 8.

78

Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A).
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exclusion upon the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United States
economy, the production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and United
States consumers.” 79 This requirement has generally been referred to as the ITC’s “public interest”
requirement.
In several recent cases, the ITC has considered requests for exclusion orders against
products infringing one or more FRAND-committed SEPs. In 2013, the ITC issued an exclusion
order prohibiting Apple from importing devices allegedly infringing certain Samsung FRANDcommitted SEPs into the U.S. 80 But in a surprising reversal, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)
disapproved (vetoed) the ITC’s exclusion order citing, among other things, the importance of
standardized products to the U.S. economy. 81
In 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) issued a joint Policy Statement relating to the consideration of the public interest with
respect to ITC exclusion orders. They state that “the remedy of an injunction or exclusion order
may be inconsistent with the public interest … where an exclusion order based on a F/RANDencumbered patent appears to be incompatible with the terms of a patent holder’s existing

79

Id. at § 1337(d)(1).

80

In the Matter of Certain Electronic Devices, Including Wireless Communication Devices, Portable Music and Data

Processing Devices, and Tablet Computers (ITC June 4, 2013) (U.S.). Samsung could invoke an ITC proceeding
because it has substantial operations in the U.S. Apple was subject to an exclusion order against its products because
they were manufactured in China and other countries.
81

Froman 2013.
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F/RAND licensing commitment.” 82 In this Policy Statement, the DOJ and PTO consider
circumstances in which an injunction or exclusion order may be an appropriate remedy, including
cases in which an implementer refuses to accept the FRAND license being offered, refuses to pay
a reasonable royalty, refuses to engage in negotiation, or is not subject to the jurisdiction of a court
that could award damages.
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has reached similar conclusions regarding
circumstances under which the public interest would, and would not, be served by the issuance of
an ITC exclusion order against a product infringing a FRAND-committed SEP. In a written
Statement to the ITC, the FTC reasoned that the ITC’s public interest considerations “support
denial of an exclusion order unless the holder of the RAND-encumbered SEP has made a
reasonable royalty offer” that has not been accepted by the implementer. 83 The FTC has also
suggested that the ITC consider ways to lessen the harmful impact of exclusion orders, for
example, by delaying their effectiveness to give the infringer time to design around the asserted
patent, and circumscribing the scope of exclusion orders to cover only infringing articles.

82

DOJ & USPTO 2013, 6.

83

FTC 2012.
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B.

European Union

Much of the European Union’s law regarding injunctions and SEPs stems from the CJEU’s
2015 decision in Huawei v. ZTE. 84 Huawei establishes that in order to comply with EU competition
law, a SEP holder that wishes to seek an injunction against an unlicensed implementer without
committing an abuse of dominance under Article 102 of the TFEU must engage in a series of
procedural steps including (i) alerting the unlicensed implementer of the infringement; and (ii)
issuing an initial FRAND offer if the implementer manifests interest in the conclusion of a
licensing agreement (these steps are described in greater detail below).
There is some disagreement among commentators regarding the circumstances under
which Huawei applies. Huawei involved alleged conduct that is termed an “exclusionary” abuse
under Article 102 of the TFEU. That is, the holder of a FRAND-pledged SEP seeks to “prevent
products manufactured by competitors from appearing or remaining on the market and thereby
reserve to itself the manufacture of the product in question.” 85 In the view of some commentators
who rely on the literal wording of the opinion, Huawei can only be read to encompass such
exclusionary conduct 86, and does not contemplate antitrust liability for so-called “exploitative”
abuses (i.e., against firms that use injunctions on FRAND-pledged SEPs to extract unfair licensing
terms, a problem often described as “patent holdup,” as described in Chapter 7). Others, however,
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Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd. v. ZTE Corp. (CJEU 2015) (EU). In addition to member states of the EU, it is likely that

the Huawei ruling would be followed in non-EU member states, such as Switzerland.
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Id. at ¶ 52.
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Petit 2017, 301.
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take the position that, because Article 102 of the TFEU deals with both exclusionary and
exploitative abuses, there is no reason to assume that the CJEU in Huawei intended to limit its
ruling to exclusionary abuses, a point that is important in the ongoing discussion of conduct by
patent assertion entities (PAEs) that largely seek monetary remedies. 87
There is also disagreement over the effect that Huawei seeks to achieve. Some argue that
under Huawei the nature of a pledge to grant a license on FRAND terms is purely
procedural. Under this interpretation, FRAND may be understood as a “comity device” that
generates bilateral fair play obligations on patent holders and prospective licensees. 88 This
understanding differs from the alternative interpretation of FRAND as imposing substantive limits
on the royalty that may be charged.

1.

Huawei v. ZTE - Procedure

The question whether and to what extent a FRAND undertaking given by a dominant SEP
holder to an SDO limits its right to bring an action for prohibitory injunction (or for the recall of
products) is clarified in Huawei v. ZTE. According to the CJEU the SEP holder is still able to seek
an injunction, but “in order to prevent an action for a prohibitory injunction . . . from being regarded
as abusive [under EU competition law], the [SEP holder] must comply with conditions which seek
to ensure a fair balance between the interests concerned.” 89 These conditions include the following:

87

See Contreras & Picht 2017 and Chapter 6.

88

See CEN-CENELEC 2015.

89

Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd. v. ZTE Corp. (CJEU 2015, ¶ 55) (EU).
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i. The SEP holder is not allowed to bring such action against the implementer without prior
notice to or prior consultation with the implementer, even if the SEP has already been used by the
implementer. 90 The SEP holder’s notification should alert the implementer of the infringement by
designating the SEP and specifying the way in which it has been infringed. This is because, owing
to the large number of SEPs incorporated in some standards, it is not certain that an implementer
will necessarily be aware that it is using a patent that is both valid and essential to the standard. 91
ii. After the implementer has expressed its willingness to conclude a licensing agreement,
it is for the SEP holder to present a specific, written offer for a license on FRAND terms, in
accordance with the undertaking given to the SDO, specifying, in particular, the amount of the
royalty and the way in which that royalty is to be calculated. 92
iii. The implementer, in turn, must diligently respond to that offer, in accordance with
recognized commercial practices in the field and in good faith. The required conduct must be
established on the basis of objective factors and implies, in particular, that there are no delaying
tactics. Should the implementer not accept the offer, it may rely on the abusive nature of an action
for prohibitory injunction or for the recall of products only if it has submitted to the proprietor of
the SEP in question, promptly and in writing, a specific counter-offer that corresponds to FRAND
terms. 93 Furthermore, where the implementer is using the teachings of the SEP before a licensing

90

Id. at ¶ 60.
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Id. at ¶ 61-62.
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Id. at ¶ 63.

93

Id. at ¶ 65-66.
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agreement has been concluded, it must, from the point at which its counter-offer is rejected,
provide appropriate security, for instance by providing a bank guarantee or by placing the amount
necessary on deposit. The calculation of the security must include, inter alia, the number of the
past acts of use of the SEP, and the alleged infringer must be able to render an account in respect
of those acts of use. 94
iv. Where no agreement is reached on the details of the FRAND terms following the
counter-offer of the implementer, the parties may, by common agreement, request that the amount
of the royalty be determined by an independent third party, by decision without delay. 95

2.

Cases Interpreting Huawei v ZTE

The rules of conduct developed by the CJEU in Huawei v. ZTE were a response to the
restrictive framework developed under the German Orange-Book-Standard 96 and StandardSpundfass 97 cases. The Huawei framework, which offers an approach that better balances the
interests of SEP holders and standards implementers serves as general guidance for FRAND
licensing negotiations. While the framework under Huawei appears procedural in nature, it also
embodies important substantive concerns of EU competition law. The steps required by the parties
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Id. at ¶ 67.
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Id. at ¶ 68.
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BGH v. 6.5.2009 – KZR 39/06 – Orange-Book-Standard (Ger.).
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BGH v. 13.7.2004 – KZR 40/02 – Standard-Spundfass (Ger.).
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under Huawei, as well as certain issues that require further clarification and which national courts
(principally, but not exclusively, in Germany) are in the process of working out, are discussed
below.

a)

Response by Implementer

As regards the SEP holder’s infringement notification, there are two issues of particular
interest. First, German courts have considered the time limits within which the alleged infringer
has to express its willingness to conclude a licensing agreement on FRAND terms. 98 The
Düsseldorf District Court found in Saint Lawrence v. Vodafone 99 that the more details the
infringement notification contains, the less time remains for the implementer to examine the
patent(s) at issue and to express its willingness to conclude such an agreement. The findings of the
lower court were confirmed by the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court because the implementer,
by waiting more than five months after the infringement notification was given, reacted belatedly
and in an evasive manner. 100 In the case of Saint Lawrence v. Deutsche Telekom the Mannheim
98

Cf. LG Mannheim v. 27.11.2015 – 2 O 106/14 – Saint Lawrence v. Deutsche Telekom, ¶ 214 (Ger.) (short time limit

as a general rule because implementer must only have the opportunity to make first sight assessment, in particular
since it remains possible to challenge the patents during the negotiations or even to reserve the right to do so after the
conclusion of a license contract); LG Düsseldorf v. 31.3.2016 – 4a O 73/14 – Saint Lawrence v. Vodafone, ¶ 218
(Ger.) (network operator needs to be given time for consulting with its suppliers); Id. at ¶ 216, 218 (information
received from patentee, market position, experience of implementer ought to play a role).
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OLG Düsseldorf v. 9.5.2016 – I-15 U 36/16 – Saint Lawrence v. Vodafone (Ger.).
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District Court held that there was no sufficient expression of willingness to conclude a licensing
agreement on FRAND terms because the supplier of an implementer, acting as intervenor in the
proceedings, needed more than three months to submit a license request after it became aware of
the action for prohibitory injunction. 101 As the Düsseldorf District Court found in Saint Lawrence
v. Vodafone, an infringement notification can be omitted if the implementer already disposes of all
necessary information and lacks willingness to license. 102

b)

Content of Infringement Notification

As to the minimum content of the infringement notification, the Düsseldorf District Court
found in the case of Saint Lawrence v. Vodafone 103 that the notification has to indicate at least the
number of the patent, the contested embodiments and the alleged acts of use performed by the
implementer. 104 There is, however, no obligation to provide additional information, in particular
regarding the interpretation of the patent claims or on which part of the standard the patent reads. 105
Whether the infringement notification must indicate only the patent for which an injunction is
sought or whether reference to other IP rights with respect to which a license is offered was left

101

LG Mannheim v. 27.11.2015 – 2 O 106/14 – Saint Lawrence v. Deutsche Telekom, ¶¶ 146-49 (Ger.).
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undecided by the Düsseldorf Court in Sisvel v. Haier. 106 The Mannheim Court determined in NTT
DoCoMo v. HTC, 107 as well as in Philips v. Archos, 108 that the SEP holder has to identify the
(allegedly) infringed patent by reference to its patent number and by indicating that the patent insuit has been declared standard-essential. Furthermore, the SEP holder is not only obliged to clarify
the relevant standard but also to specify the pertinent part of the standard and the infringing element
of the implementer’s products in a way that enables the implementer to assess whether its use of
the standard infringes on the patent in suit. 109 In this respect, the Mannheim District court found
in both NTT DoCoMo v. HTC and Philips v. Archos that presenting claim charts corresponding to
recognized commercial practice for licensing negotiations is, in principle, an acceptable way to
give notice of the alleged infringement. 110 On the other hand, a mere statement that the
implementer infringed the patent in suit by producing or marketing products implementing the
standard is not adequate. 111
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c)

Licensing offer

The third step under Huawei v. ZTE involves the SEP holder’s making an offer that is
FRAND. 112 In order to understand the relationship between the steps described by Huawei,
reference can be made to the findings of the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court in Saint Lawrence
v. Vodafone. 113 According to this decision, the conduct of the parties required by the CJEU
constitutes a mechanism of alternating, consecutive steps in which no subsequent conduct
requirement is triggered unless the other party performed the previous “step.” As a consequence,
the SEP holder was, in that case, not obliged to submit a FRAND licensing offer at all since the
implementer failed to signal its willingness to license. 114
Some decisions rendered by German courts subsequent to Huawei v. ZTE elaborate on the
conditions under which the level of royalties, which must be set forth in the SEP holder’s licensing
offer, can be considered “reasonable.” In this respect, two alternative approaches should be
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distinguished (see, generally, discussion of monetary remedies under FRAND obligations in Part
II.D., above). Under the first approach, it is for the courts to determine whether the royalties offered
by the SEP holder qualify as FRAND. For instance, the Düsseldorf District Court found in Saint
Lawrence v. Vodafone that a worldwide licensing offer covering a whole SEP pool, at a rate of
$0.26 per infringing device, and which was otherwise consistent with the SEP holder’s existing
licensing practices, to be FRAND under Huawei v. ZTE. 115 The findings of the court of first
instance were confirmed in the subsequent judgment of the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court. 116
Under the second approach, it is not the court’s task to determine whether the licensing
conditions and royalties are FRAND. On the contrary, the judges should only assess, based on a
summary assessment, whether the SEP holder’s licensing offer and royalties evidently violate the
FRAND concept (i.e., the offer is not obviously not FRAND). In this case, the Mannheim District
Court held that the licensing offer complied with the procedures outlined in Huawei v. ZTE,117 in
particular because the SEP holder had explained its calculation of the licensing fee based on the
percentage of patents in the WCMA/SIPRO and the VIA patent pools held by the SEP holder.
Comparable findings were made by the Mannheim District Court in Pioneer v. Acer. 118 The
standard of review applied by the Mannheim Court was criticized in subsequent proceedings
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before the Karlsruhe Higher Regional Court, which held that courts must determine whether
licensing offers are FRAND and cannot limit their scrutiny to a summary assessment of whether
such offers are obviously not-FRAND. 119 Taking into account the opinion of the court of second
instance, the Mannheim District Court did not resolve in Philips v. Archos 120 whether it is obliged
to reconsider its standard of review. Nevertheless, it found that the SEP proprietor did not
sufficiently substantiate why royalties of $1.00 per unit should be FRAND according to Huawei.

d)

Calculation of Royalties

Furthermore, the German decisions elucidate the extent to which a SEP holder must specify
the calculation of royalties in its licensing offer under Huawei. In general, the offer must specify
the relevant conditions in way that, in order to conclude a licensing agreement, the implementer
has merely to state its acceptance. 121 Accordingly, the Mannheim District Court ruled in both NTT
DoCoMo v. HTC 122 and Philips v. Archos 123 that the calculation of the license fee must be
explained in a manner that enables the implementer to understand, on the basis of objective criteria,
why the SEP holder considers its licensing offer to be FRAND. In the case of a quota license
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agreement, it is not sufficient merely to indicate the royalties per unit. The respective amount must
be made sufficiently “transparent,” e.g., by reference to an established standard licensing program
or by indicating other reference values, such as a pool license fee. 124 In contrast, the court deemed
a licensing offer sufficient if the calculation of royalties is explained based on the percentage of
patents in the WCMA/SIPRO and VIA patent pools held by the SEP holder. 125 The Düsseldorf
District Court stated in Saint Lawrence v. Vodafone that the SEP holder has to provide the
information necessary to determine the amount of royalties to be paid, e.g., the royalty per unit
and the products covered by the license. While the Court left undecided whether additional
indications, e.g., concerning the FRAND character of the licensing offer, are necessary to comply
with Huawei, it found that the SEP holder’s duty to inform should not be interpreted too strictly
as FRAND does regularly encompass a range of terms and conditions. 126

e)

Portfolio Licenses

Several decisions discuss whether a (worldwide) portfolio license offered by the SEP
holder is FRAND according to Huawei v. ZTE. The Mannheim District Court seems to favor the
FRAND-compatibility of such licenses in Saint Lawrence v. Deutsche Telekom, 127 but at first it
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did not come to a clear conclusion. In its subsequent decision in Pioneer v. Acer, 128 however, an
offer of the SEP holder was considered sufficient, 129 in particular because a worldwide license
granted to the parent of a group corresponded to recognized commercial practice in the field.
Correspondingly, the Düsseldorf District Court said in Saint Lawrence v. Vodafone 130 that the
more licensing agreements implementing comparable terms the SEP holder has already concluded,
the stronger the presumption that these conditions are FRAND, unless factual reasons—which
must be demonstrated by the implementer—justify modified terms. Recognized commercial
practice in the relevant sector has to be considered when defining the admissible scope of the
licensing agreement. The UK court in Unwired Planet v. Huawei also held that a license among
global industry players should be worldwide, and that it was unreasonable for the potential licensee
to insist on a UK-only license in this context. 131 Based on these cases, it appears that if patent
portfolios are usually covered by group or worldwide licenses in the relevant market, a
(worldwide) portfolio license will be FRAND for purposes of EU competition law unless the
circumstances of the specific case, e.g. the SEP holders’ or the implementer’s market activity being
limited to one geographic market, require a modification.
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f)

Response by Implementer – timing and content

The German courts have also shed some light on the way an implementer ought to react to
the SEP holder’s licensing offer. In particular, the courts discuss whether there is an obligation of
the implementer to respond to a licensing offer that is not FRAND. While the Düsseldorf District
Court confirmed such an obligation at first in Sisvel v. Haier 132 and left this issue undecided in
Saint Lawrence v. Vodafone, 133 the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court explicitly denied in NTT
DoCoMo v. HTC 134 that there is an obligation to respond if the SEP holder refrained from
submitting a FRAND licensing offer. The question of whether the implementer may respond to a
non-FRAND offer in a different manner than by submitting a specific counter-offer, in particular
by merely demonstrating that the SEP holder’s offer was not FRAND, remained unanswered. 135
In contrast, the Mannheim District Court found, in NTT DoCoMo v. HTC, 136 as well as Saint
Lawrence v. Deutsche Telekom, 137 that even if the preceding licensing offer is not (fully) in
compliance with FRAND, the implementer would still be under a duty to react diligently and to
submit a corresponding FRAND counter-offer. In order to trigger the counter-offer obligation it is
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sufficient that the licensing offer contains all information, in particular regarding royalty
calculation, which is necessary for the implementer to submit a counter-offer corresponding to
FRAND terms. 138 Even though the Mannheim Court recently reaffirmed, in Philips v. Archos,139
the general findings of its previous decisions it specified that an exception applies where it is
established in the course of a summary examination that the licensing offer is evidently not
FRAND and therefore constitutes an abuse of dominance.
As to the time limits for an adequate reaction of the implementer: In a more general manner,
the Mannheim District court held in Philips v. Archos 140 that the period of time in which the
implementer has to react depends on the facts of the case as well as on the principles of good faith
and recognized commercial practice. 141 More specifically, the same court found in NTT DoCoMo
v. HTC 142 that the behavior of the implementer is considered insufficient if the counter-offer is
made only 1.5 years after receiving the licensing offer and 0.5 years after the the SEP holder filed
suit.
Furthermore, the courts analyzed under which conditions a counter-offer meets the
requirements of Huawei in terms of content. In the case of Saint Lawrence v. Deutsche Telekom
the Mannheim District Court denied the existence of a specific counter-offer because the royalty
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was not specified in the document itself but was intended to be determined by an independent third
party. Whether the limitation of the counter-offer to Germany was in compliance with FRAND
terms remained undecided. 143 However, in Saint Lawrence v. Vodafone the Düsseldorf District
Court decided that none of the counter-offers of the Intervenor were FRAND in terms of content.
They were either inadmissibly limited to Germany, contained no precise royalty, were not
submitted “promptly” because the standard user had waited until the oral pleadings in the parallel
procedure, or they proposed royalties per device which the Court considered as too low144
Correspondingly, the Mannheim District Court denied in Pioneer v. Acer the FRAND conformity
of a implementer’s offer because the intended limitation of the license to Germany would have
been inappropriate given the facts of the case and recognized commercial practice in the respective
market. 145

3.

Other European Law Principles

In addition to the EU procedural requirements under Huawei which are described above,
national law may be implicated when a SEP holder seeks an injunction for a FRAND-encumbered
SEP. For example, Polish law would analyze the seeking of injunctive relief by patentees who
made prior FRAND commitments under an abuse of rights doctrine independent of EU
competition law. This doctrine provides a general defense based on the provisions of the Polish
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Civil Code, 146 which can be applied to abuses of all types of private rights 147, including patents.
This analysis would likely look to arguments such as reliance on FRAND promises made by SEP
holders during the standard-setting process, an obligation to act in good faith toward other parties
operating in the market. 148 Polish law would rather approach all types of FRAND pledges in a
similar manner, whether they are made within or outside the standard-setting context.
Implementers would base their defenses against injunctions on breaches of reliance, loyalty, or
good faith.
The reasoning behind denying injunctions on the basis of the abuse of rights doctrine is
supported by equitable arguments rather than economic factors or patent law—particularly the
ability of the patent system to stimulate investment in innovation. The abuse defense would likely
be effective only if raised by an implementer acting in good faith—a willing implementer.

4.

Injunctions and Alternative Dispute Resolution in Europe

Despite its potential benefits, the procedural framework introduced by Huawei has not
solved all the practical challenges and difficulties that can arise in FRAND disputes. For example,
Huawei fails to offer a solution to the territorial fragmentation of FRAND disputes or to the
proliferation of parallel local court proceedings. The continuing conduct of multiple parallel
proceedings is not cost- or time-efficient, in spite of the fact that many if not all FRAND disputes
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are global (and would ideally materialize in global FRAND licensing transactions as noted
above). 149 Numerous complex jurisdictional issues arise in this context, including the risk that
courts will engage in a “race to the bottom” in order to present an attractive venue for FRAND
litigation, and parties will engage in a “race to the courthouse” to ensure that their case is heard in
the most favorable jurisdiction. 150 As a result, it is important to (continue to) explore means for
rationalizing remedies offered both by courts and alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
mechanisms in this area. 151

C.

Korea

Unlike the U.S., in which injunctions are granted under principles of equity, patentees in
Korea are entitled to an injunction automatically in case of patent infringement. 152 Only in
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exceptional cases where patentees are regarded as having abused their rights, courts will deny an
injunction. 153 Thus, the question is whether such abuse is likely to be found when a SEP holder
has violated its FRAND commitment.
In Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. v. Apple Korea Ltd., the Seoul Central District Court held
that it is an abuse of patent rights for a SEP holder to seek an injunction under a FRAND committed
patent if the SEP holder has violated its duty to negotiate in good faith with the implementer and
tries to maintain its dominance over the market contrary to the policy goals of the patent law. 154
This duty to negotiate in good faith includes a duty to offer any potential licensees a FRAND
license with FRAND terms. Korean courts have held, however, that a SEP holder does not have a
duty to disclose detailed information about comparable licenses with third parties.
SEP holders in Korea have a duty to negotiate in good faith with a party willing to obtain
a license under FRAND terms. 155 Yet, as discussed above in the context of “holdout”, a good faith
negotiation is impossible when a potential licensee has no intention of obtaining a FRAND license
at all. It is reasonable to consider a willing licensee to be a potential licensee that engages in
licensing negotiations and proposes a specific royalty rate with a reasonable calculation basis. In
Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. v. Apple Korea Ltd., the Seoul Central District Court held that the
potential licensee does not have to deposit royalties in advance to be qualified as a willing
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licensee. 156 Moreover, the court found that there was a large gap between royalty rate proposals
made by Samsung and Apple and, also, that there were no serious and intensive licensing
negotiations in good faith between them. 157 When both parties were to blame for the lack of a good
faith negotiation, the Court concluded that it was difficult to see any abuse of patent rights on the
part of the SEP holder in seeking an injunction. 158 This shows the difficulty of proving abuse of a
patent right in Korea.

D.

Japan

Article 100(1) of the Japanese Patent Act provides “A patentee or exclusive licensee may
demand a person who infringes or is likely to infringe the patent right or exclusive license to stop
or prevent such infringement.” 159 Under this Article, Japanese courts award injunctions almost
automatically when they find a likelihood of patent infringement. The abuse of rights doctrine,
which is stipulated in Article 1(3) of the Civil Code of Japan, 160 is theoretically applicable to the
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exercise of patent rights. But in patent infringement cases, courts have rarely applied this doctrine.
The IP High Court reversed this trend in Samsung v. Apple Japan. 161
In Samsung v. Apple Japan, Samsung accused Apple of infringing Samsung’s SEPs in the
ETSI UMTS standard. 162 According to the IP High Court, implementers wishing to manufacture
a product compliant with the UMTS standard have no choice but to practice the SEPs, as “it is
impossible for them to adopt alternative technology or to change the product design.” 163
“Therefore, if the patentee is unconditionally allowed to exercise the right to seek an injunction
based on the [SEPs, the implementers] may be put into a situation where they are forced to pay a
high royalty or agree to extremely unfavorable license conditions that are not FRAND Terms, or
to abandon the business project itself, so as to avoid the damage that may arise from such
injunction.” 164 The court also observed that “the UMTS standard contains a large number of
patents owned by different owners (1800 or more patent families declared essential by 50 or more
patentees).” 165 It is difficult for an implementer to obtain licenses to such a large number of patents
in advance, after confirming whether each of such patents is essential or not. 166 As the court
explained:
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if the patentee is unconditionally allowed to seek an injunction based on the [SEPs],
the use of the UMTS standard would become practically impossible. [This]
situation would have a negative impact on the dissemination of the UMTS standard
and run counter to the purpose of the ETSI IPR Policy . . . . Further, if such situation
arises, the general public would be unable to enjoy a variety of benefits that would
be available if the harmonization and dissemination of communication standards
was achieved. 167

Therefore, the court reasoned that in relation to a SEP, it is not appropriate to allow a party that
made a FRAND declaration to seek an injunction based on the SEP against an implementer willing
to obtain a license on FRAND Terms. 168
The court went on to reason that an injunction “should be allowed against an implementer
engaged in manufacturing, sales, etc. of a . . . standard-compliant product without any intention of
obtaining a FRAND license,” 169 as such implementer cannot be considered to be complying with
its own end of the FRAND bargain, and the patentee would not be adequately protected if its ability
to seek an injunction even against such parties is restricted. 170 Nevertheless, because allowing a
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SEP holder to seek an injunction involves potential adverse effects, the court must carefully
consider whether the prospective licensee had no intention of entering into a FRAND license. 171
On this basis, the court concluded that the exercise of the right to seek an injunction based
on a SEP by a SEP holder who made a FRAND commitment would constitute abuse of right
(Article 1(3) of the Civil Code) and therefore is not allowed, if the implementer successfully
alleges and proves that the SEP holder made the FRAND commitment and the implementer
intended to receive it. 172 As to the specific case at hand, the court found that Apple intended to
receive a FRAND license, and denied Samsung’s claim for injunction. 173

E.

China

Courts in China have recently considered injunctions in two cases involving FRANDcommitted SEPs. In Iwncomm v. Sony, 174 the Beijing IP court issued an injunction against the
implementer Sony for the infringement of a FRAND-committed SEP covering the Chinese WAPI
wireless networking standard; and the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court issued an injunction
for the infringement of two FRAND-committed patents essential to the 4G standard in Huawei v.
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Samsung. 175 In both cases, the courts concluded that the patentee had been a willing licensor and
the infringer an unwilling licensee.
In addition to these cases, two Chinese courts have recently released guidance regarding
disputes relating to SEPs disclosed in recommended national, industrial, or local standards. In the
Interpretations (II) of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues concerning the Application
of Law in the Trial of Patent Infringement Dispute Cases art. 24 (effective as of April 1, 2016),
the Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China states that courts should not award
injunctive relief when a SEP owner deliberately fails to comply with its obligation to grant a
FRAND license to a manufacturer, and the manufacturer is not clearly at fault. Chinese courts
recently have begun to address how fault on the part of either the patentee or the prospective
licensee impacts the availability of injunctive relief in FRAND cases. 176

F.

Discussion and Analysis: FRAND and Injunctions

U.S. courts have analyzed the question whether the holder of a FRAND-encumbered SEP
may seek to enjoin unlicensed implementers from practicing the SEP under the eBay framework ,
focusing primarily on whether the FRAND commitment implies that the SEP holder has conceded
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that it will accept monetary damages in lieu of the exclusionary remedy of an injunction and
thereby suffer no “irreparable harm” if an injunction is not issued. In addition, appeals to the fourth
eBay prong have caused some to consider the public interest associated with the exclusion of
standardized products from the market, as the USTR did in rejecting the ITC’s exclusion order
against Apple in 2013 (see above). The U.S. FTC has also asserted that SEP holders’ attempts to
enjoin “willing” licensees (as variously defined) may violate the FTC Act and antitrust laws. In
the FTC’s settlement with Google and Motorola, a detailed procedure involving several
negotiation stages was established before Google/Motorola was permitted to seek an injunction
against a SEP implementer.
In jurisdictions, such as Germany and Korea, in which injunctions issue more or less
automatically, recourse is more likely to be made to competition law. 177 Additionally in the EU,
the EU competition law, which benefits from the principles of direct effect and supremacy over
EU member states’ laws, is also perhaps more attractive as a tool for patent litigants than the
national patent laws of the EU member states (though this distinction may be lessened in view of
the EU Enforcement Directive 178). Rather than focusing primarily on the content of a FRAND
commitment, the CJEU’s decision in Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd. v. ZTE Corp. established detailed
procedural requirements for both SEP holders and implementers when a SEP holder seeks an
injunction. When the procedure is not followed by the SEP holder, it is vulnerable to claims of
abuse of dominance under Article 102 of the TFEU. When the Huawei procedure is followed by
both parties, the result is either an agreement between the parties or an adjudicated or arbitrated
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FRAND royalty determination that the implementer must honor, lest an injunction be issued. And
if the Huawei procedure is followed by the SEP holder but not by the implementer, the SEP holder
may seek and obtain an injunction without violating Article 102 of the TFEU. The Huawei
procedure is apparently not simple for implementers to follow, as several post-Huawei cases have
resulted in injunctions after an implementer failed to comply with some element of the procedure
such as making a valid counter-offer or posting bond in the amount of the estimated royalty. As
such, it is possible that the procedure in Huawei is over-specified and perhaps rewards litigation
experience and procedural savvy rather than a genuine desire to enter into license transactions. On
the other hand, the post-Huawei cases may reveal the occurrence of intentional holdout at higher
rates than expected.
As noted by Advocate General Wathelet in his opinion in Huawei, 179 the matters in dispute
“could adequately - if not better - be resolved in the context of other branches of law or by
mechanisms other than the rules of competition law.” What the Advocate General means by other
branches of law is unclear. But one might assume that he has in mind general defenses—such as
abuse of rights—and possibly the application of patent remedies itself. If the disputes over
injunctions for FRAND-pledged patents could be resolved within the law on patent remedies then
Directive 2004/48/EC on IPR enforcement would provide arguments against granting injunctions
to holders of FRAND-pledged patents, on the general principles discussed in Chapter 4. First,
proportionality as a general principle governing remedies could be used. Proportionality—as the
directive provides (and as discussed in Chapter 4)—requires that remedies be applied in a fair and
equitable manner and that there are safeguards against abuse in place. Second, the directive also
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explains that in the application of remedies circumstances of the case need to be considered and
the nature of an IP right should be taken into account.
The standard for proving abusive conduct in Japan, as described in Samsung v. Apple
Japan, appears to be much more straightforward, involving only the stated (or proven) willingness
of the implementer to accept a license of the asserted SEPs. The courts in Korea may have split
the difference between the formalistic EU approach and the relatively unspecified Japanese
approach, holding in Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. v. Apple Korea Ltd. that abusive conduct will
not be found if the parties engage in good faith negotiation of a FRAND license. In order to be
found to have acted in good faith, an implementer need only show that it engaged in licensing
negotiations and proposed a specific royalty rate with a reasonable calculation basis. But if a failure
of negotiation is attributable to the action or inaction of both parties, an abuse by the SEP holder
will not be found when it obtains an injunction against the implementer.
In our view, each of these approaches can profitably be informed by the other. To observers
from the U.S. and other common law jurisdiction, the fact that in the EU and other civil law
jurisdictions injunctions typically issue automatically in patent cases, subject only to the violation
of competition law, seems unusual. Patent law has developed independently of competition law
and the abuse of rights doctrine, and it seems reasonable for patent remedies to be governed by an
internally consistent and cohesive framework independent of other external legal regimes
(particularly regimes that are imposed by extra-national authority such as the EU). As such, we
recommend that courts consider imposing reasonable conditions on the issuance of injunctive
relief, such as are discussed in Chapter 4, even absent a violation of competition law. Because the
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issuance of injunctive relief is typically a binary decision (either an injunction is issued or not), 180
the types of moderation and proportionality that are available to adjust monetary damages for the
parties’ behavior is typically not available in the injunctive arena. Instead, some measure of judicial
discretion in the granting of injunctive relief could more accurately fit this remedy to the actions
and behavior of the parties. This is not to say that civil law jurisdictions should adopt an eBaystyle equitable analysis for the assessment of injunctive remedies, or refuse injunctions at the rates
seen in U.S. courts, but only that some measure of judicial discretion be exercised. 181 Our
discussion as to the how that discretion should be exercised is found in Chapter 4.
On the other hand, the equitable analysis of party behavior in the context of SEPs and
FRAND under U.S. law still suffers from a lack of precision and definition. The Federal Circuit
in Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. offers a 3-way split opinion regarding the presumptions
and conduct that should inform the decision to grant injunctive relief. Parties thus lack clear
guidance in this critical area. U.S. courts analyzing injunction availability in SEP cases have
focused largely on the prongs of the eBay test pertaining to irreparable harm and adequacy of
monetary damages. We recommend that when balancing equities between the parties, courts start
with the procedures modeling well-functioning party behavior as laid out by the CJEU in Huawei
Techs. Co. Ltd. v. ZTE Corp. or under the law of Japan or Korea. While each of these procedural
analyses was developed with potential violations of competition law or obligations of parties
entering into a contract to negotiate in good faith in mind, at their root they are each intended to

180

But see the discussion of tailored injunctions in Chapter 4.

181

As noted above, the EU Enforcement Directive requires that remedies be applied in a fair and equitable manner,

thus introducing an element of “equity” even into the EU analysis. See Directive 2004/48/EC.
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model a well-functioning bilateral relationship within the standard-setting context. As such, a full
and fair assessment of the appropriateness of equitable relief would do well to consider such
factors.
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Appendix - National Law Considerations for Monetary FRAND Damages

A.

Germany

Under § 139 of the German Patent Law (PatG), a patent owner may recover monetary
damages from an infringer that intentionally or negligently makes use of the respective patent in
the sense of §§ 9, 10 PatG. 182 In order to determine the specific amount of monetary damages to
be paid by the infringer, the patent owner can select between three different calculation methods
pursuant to § 139(2) PatG. These ways of calculating damages can, however, neither be aggregated
nor mixed. 183
The first calculation approach, pursuant to § 139(2) PatG in conjunction with §§ 249, 252
of the German Civil Code (BGB), refers to the “difference in wealth” of the patent owner caused
by the infringement (“Differenzmethode”). 184 In order to be compensated, the patent owner has to
show a financial loss and causality between this loss and the infringement. 185 If the action seeks to

182

Mes 2015, § 139 rec. 6, 121; cf. Benkard 2015, § 139 rec. 13 et seq.; Keukenschrijver 2016, § 139 rec. 97.

183

Benkard 2015, § 139 rec. 61; Mes 2015, § 139 rec. 123, 177; Keukenschrijver 2016, § 139 rec. 140; LG Düsseldorf

v. 19.1.2016 – 4b O 120/14 – Unwired Planet v. Samsung, ¶ VII.6.b.cc (Ger.).

184

LG Düsseldorf v. 19.1.2016 – 4b O 120/14 – Unwired Planet v. Samsung, ¶ VII.6.b.cc (Ger.).

185

Mes 2015, § 139 rec. 123; Keukenschrijver 2016, § 139 rec. 154; Benkard 2015, § 139 rec. 57 et seq.
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recover lost profits, it is for the patent owner to prove that it could have obtained the amount of
profits claimed in the absence of the infringing activity. 186
The second calculation method, laid down by the third sentence of § 139(2) PatG, often
called the “objective calculation of damages” and being widely used in practice, 187 refers to the
reasonable royalties that could be obtained from a third person for the use of the patent. 188 The
approach is based on the assumption that the infringer should compensate for the pecuniary
benefits it obtained from using the patent in-suit. The precise calculation should follow the
hypothetical contractual terms that would have been agreed upon by reasonable parties taking into
account all relevant factors for the determination of the patent value, such as a potential
monopolistic position of the patent owner, the economic importance of the patent, customary
royalties, royalties already agreed upon or standardized licensing agreements. 189
The third approach, formulated in the second sentence of § 139(2) PatG, concerns the
recovery of the infringer’s profits. Since it is only a calculation method and not a standalone claim,
it must be proven that the patent owner incurred actual losses. 190 Furthermore, the owner can claim

186

Keukenschrijver 2016, § 139 rec. 156.

187

Id. at § 139 rec. 138.

188

Mes 2015, § 139 rec. 123; Benkard 2015, § 139 rec. 61.

189

Mes 2015, § 139 rec. 131 et seq., 134; Benkard 2015, § 139 rec. 66; Keukenschrijver 2016, § 139 rec. 164. This

calculation methodology bears some resemblance to the Georgia-Pacific framework used in the U.S.
190

Mes 2015, § 139 rec. 146.
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only those profits that effectively resulted from the patent infringement. 191 As a general rule, the
profits are calculated by subtracting the costs related to the patent infringement from the revenues
of the infringer. 192 However, according to the German Federal Court (BGH) the infringer is not
allowed to deduct any fixed costs together with the production costs that are directly related to the
manufacturing of the infringing product. 193 Fixed costs can only be considered if they are
exclusively related to the infringement. 194 Other costs (“business-as-usual-costs”) that occur
irrespective of the volume of production and supply as a consequence of the general business
activity of the infringer are not relevant. The necessary evidence has to be provided by the
infringer. 195
Irrespective of the calculation method, courts are permitted to estimate the damages to be
paid pursuant to § 287 of the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) if the patent owner is not
able to substantiate its financial losses. 196 As a consequence, damages can be related to the
royalties under a FRAND license, in particular where the patent owner selects the “license analogy
method” instead of other available calculation methods. However, the patent owner is not

191

Id. at § 139 rec. 163.

192

Benkard 2015, § 139 rec. 73.

193

Mes 2015, § 139 rec. 148; Benkard 2015, § 139 rec. 73b.

194

Benkard 2015, § 139 rec. 73c.

195

Id. at § 139 rec. 73g.

196

Id. at § 139 rec. 60.
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prevented from claiming further damages exceeding FRAND royalties, under the condition that
they correspond to the enrichment of the infringer. 197
Important aspects of the relation between the level of royalties under a FRAND license and
monetary damages for patent infringement were illustrated by the Düsseldorf District Court in
Unwired Planet v. Samsung. 198 As noted above, the Huawei obligations do not hinder a SEP holder
from bringing an action for damages against an implementer and it can freely choose between said
calculations methods. 199 However, the CJEU requirements indirectly influence the extent to which
compensation for past acts of infringement can be sought. If the implementer, having demonstrated
its willingness to take a license, is able to raise a counterclaim according to § 33 of the German
Competition Act (GWB), in conjunction with Article 102 of the TFEU, because the SEP
proprietor, having made a FRAND declaration for the patent in-suit, abusively refused to grant a
license, monetary damages can be limited to the maximum amount of FRAND royalties for the
period after the refusal. 200 In Unwired Planet, no such cap on damages applied, because the
standard implementer omitted to express his readiness to conclude a licensing agreement. 201 In

197

Id. at § 139 rec. 63a.

198

LG Düsseldorf v. 19.1.2016 – 4b O 120/14 – Unwired Planet v. Samsung (Ger.).

199

Id. at ¶ VII.6.b.bb.

200

Id. at ¶ VII.6.b.dd.

201

Id. at ¶ VII.6.b.ee.
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contrast to actions for injunction, abusive behavior of the SEP holder will not be assumed if it fails
to provide an infringement notification. 202

B.

Switzerland

1.

Legal Status of FRAND Commitments under Swiss Law

A Swiss court deciding the issue of damages for FRAND-encumbered SEPs will first have
to assess the legal nature of the FRAND commitment which is made by the SEP holder to the
relevant SSO under the applicable contract law that governs such commitment. By way of
illustration, the ETSI IPR Policy203 provides a FRAND commitment by which the owners of
standard essential patents 204 commit to make their patents available to willing licensees under

202

Id. at ¶ VII.6.b.dd.

203

ETSI 2018, Annex 6; see also the webpage dedicated to IPR: ETSI, Intellectual Property Rights (last visited Apr.

30, 2018).

204

Essential patents are defined in ETSI 2018, Annex 6 § 15.6 (“‘ESSENTIAL’ as applied to IPR means that it is not

possible on technical (but not commercial) grounds, taking into account normal technical practice and the state of the
art generally available at the time of standardization, to make, sell, lease, otherwise dispose of, repair, use or operate
EQUIPMENT or METHODS which comply with a STANDARD without infringing that IPR. For the avoidance of
doubt in exceptional cases where a STANDARD can only be implemented by technical solutions, all of which are
infringements of IPRs, all such IPRs shall be considered ESSENTIAL.”).
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FRAND terms. 205 Section 6.1 of the ETSI IPR Policy provides that “[w]hen an ESSENTIAL
IPR[ 206] relating to a particular STANDARD or TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION is brought to the
attention of ETSI, the Director-General of ETSI shall immediately request the owner to give within
three months an irrevocable undertaking in writing that it is prepared to grant irrevocable licenses
on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) terms and conditions under such IPR . . .
.” Appendix A to the ETSI IPR Policy (entitled “IPR Licensing Declaration Forms”) 207 contains
different forms 208 to be completed and signed by the owner of the relevant IP rights under which
such IP owner is invited to make a formal and binding statement according to which “it and its
AFFILIATES are prepared to grant irrevocable licenses under its/their IPR(s) on terms and
conditions which are in accordance with Clause 6.1 of the ETSI IPR Policy . . . .” 209

205

206

Id. at Annex 6 § 6.1.

Each of the capitalized terms is defined in id. at Annex 6 § 15.

207

Id. at Annex 6 app. A.

208

A “General IPR Licensing Declaration” and an “IPR Information Statement and Licensing Declaration”. Id.

209

The relevant portions of the “General IPR Licensing Declaration” include: “it and its AFFILIATES are prepared

to grant irrevocable licenses under its/their IPR(s) on terms and conditions which are in accordance with Clause 6.1
of the ETSI IPR Policy, in respect of the STANDARD(S), TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION(S), or the ETSI Project(s),
as identified above, to the extent that the IPR(s) are or become, and remain ESSENTIAL to practice that/those
STANDARD(S) or TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION(S) or, as applicable, any STANDARD or TECHNICAL
SPECIFICATION resulting from proposals or Work Items within the current scope of the above identified ETSI
Project(s), for the field of use of practice of such STANDARD or TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION . . . .”; similarly,
the “IPR Information Statement and Licensing Declaration” includes: “To the extent that the IPR(s) disclosed in the
attached IPR Information Statement Annex are or become, and remain ESSENTIAL in respect of the ETSI Work Item,
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These documents provide that their “construction, validity and performance . . . shall be
governed by the laws of France.” 210 The legal issue is consequently to analyze the nature and the
enforceability of the commitments (“undertaking” 211) that are made by the owners of the relevant
SEPs to the SSOs under the applicable governing law.
By stating that the owners of SEPs are “prepared to grant irrevocable licenses” 212 under
their SEPs to third party implementers (in their formal undertaking that they make to the SSOs),
the issue is whether third party beneficiaries can request the performance of such obligation, which
in turn depends on whether these potential licensees (which have not directly entered into any
contract with the owner of the relevant SEPs) can be considered as third party beneficiaries. This
issue, which obviously depends on the interpretation of the relevant declaration under the
applicable law, remains disputed, 213 it being noted that granting—by contract—rights to a third

STANDARD and/or TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION identified in the attached IPR Information Statement Annex,
the Declarant and/or its AFFILIATES are (1) prepared to grant irrevocable licenses under this/these IPR(s) on terms
and conditions which are in accordance with Clause 6.1 of the ETSI IPR Policy . . . .” Id.

210

Id.

211

Id. (describing the grant of a license as an “undertaking”).

212

Id.

213

For a contractual analysis of FRAND commitments, see Straus 2011; Brooks & Geradin 2010; for the opposite

view (considering that (common law) contract theory does not constitute the proper legal basis for analyzing FRAND),
see Contreras 2015c.
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party is generally admitted from a transnational perspective. 214 Under French law, which is of
particular relevance here (given that it is the law which governs the ETSI Declarations), the view
has been expressed that the commitments made by owners of SEPs under the ETSI Declarations
can qualify as “stipulation pour autrui” within the meaning of Article 1121 of the French Civil
Code. 215
By assuming that willing licensees (implementers of the technology standards covered by
the SEPs) could be considered third party beneficiaries of these commitments under the relevant
law, the next issue would be to define precisely the legal nature and the scope of the commitments
made by the owners of SEPs, i.e. what is the contractual obligation that the owners of SEPs have
accepted to perform for the benefit of the potential licensees and that such licensees could directly
enforce (as third party beneficiaries)? The specificity and the difficulty of this analysis results from
the finding that the relevant obligation does not consist of a straightforward – i.e. easy to identify
and thus to enforce – contractual obligation. 216 Quite to the contrary, the owners of SEPs commit

214

See, e.g., Unidroit 2016, art. 5.2.1 (contracts in favour of third parties): “(1) The parties (the ‘promisor’ and the

‘promisee’) may confer by express or implied agreement a right on a third party (the ‘beneficiary’). (2) The existence
and content of the beneficiary’s right against the promisor are determined by the agreement of the parties and are
subject to any conditions or other limitations under the agreement.”

215

See Straus 2011; Caron 2013, 1008 et seq.

216

By contrast (for the sake of comparison), a contractual obligation which would be simple to enforce by a third party

beneficiary would be an obligation of the debtor to pay a given amount to such third party under certain circumstances;
see this decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court: 4C.5/2003 (TF 2003) (Switz.) (interpreting the financial penalty
clause of a non-competition undertaking in a shareholders’ agreement, which allowed enforcement by the company,
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to be prepared to license out their patents to third party licensees on FRAND terms and conditions,
whereby there remains considerable room as to what shall constitute FRAND terms and
conditions. 217
Under Swiss law (assuming that it would apply), the commitment could be considered as
an “agreement to conclude a contract” within the meaning of Article 22¶ 1 of the Swiss Code of
Obligations (SCO) which provides that “[p]arties may reach a binding agreement to enter into a
contract at a later date.” Pursuant to this provision, one contracting party can promise to its
contracting party that it shall enter into a contract with a third party, so that such third party can
subsequently request the performance of this obligation (as a third party beneficiary), i.e. it can
request that the contract shall be entered into or claim damages for breach of such obligation.218
The validity of such a preliminary contract (i.e. the contract by which one party agrees to enter
into another future contract) depends on whether the object of the contract is determined or is at
least determinable. 219

as granting a direct enforcement right to a third party beneficiary (the company) by application of Obligationenrecht
[OR] [Code of Obligations], SR 220, art. 112 ¶ 2 (Switz.) (Swiss Code of Obligations)).

217

See, e.g., Allensworth 2014.

218

See, e.g., BGE 98 II 305 (BGer 1972, ¶ 1) (Switz.) (“The . . . clause between the parties to the contract of sale is a

preliminary contract (Art. 22 OR) in favor of third parties, i.e. the plaintiffs. They were directly favored and could
therefore, according to Art. 112 (2) OR, request from the defendant that he shall conclude the main contract . . . .”
(translated)).
219

BGE 118 II 32 (BGer 1992, ¶ 3b) (Switz.); BGE 98 II 305 (BGer 1972, ¶ 1) (Switz.).
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From this perspective, the enforceability of the obligation against an owner of SEPs (to
execute a license agreement with a third party licensee) will depend on whether such obligation is
sufficiently determinable in order to qualify as a valid contractual obligation, the performance of
which could be requested and enforced.
If a Swiss court considers that (as a result of its interpretation of the FRAND commitment
on the basis of the law that shall govern it) the FRAND commitment constitutes a binding
obligation that could be enforced by an implementer against the patent owner and that would
further prevent the patent owner from initiating any patent infringement litigation against an
implementer including an action for damages, a FRAND commitment could limit or affect a patent
holder's ability to recover monetary damages from an infringing implementer of a standard. The
reason would be that by bringing an action for damages against an implementer, the patent owner
would be in breach of its contractual obligation resulting from the FRAND commitment and would
thus be liable for the damages resulting from such contractual breach. 220

2.

Patent Damages under Swiss Law

As reflected in the Swiss case law 221 and legal literature, 222 Swiss law is characterized by
the lack of a special legal regime that would specifically regulate the damages resulting from the

220

This could be compared to a situation in which a licensor would claim damage from a licensee which would have

complied with the contractual terms of use of the license.

221

BGE 132 III 379 (BGer 2005) (Switz.).

222

See, e.g., Benhamou 2013.
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infringement of IP rights. Under Swiss law, the financial consequences of an infringement of an
IP right are governed by general tort law, 223 which is regulated in the Swiss Code of Obligations
(“SCO”), 224 An IP infringement constitutes a tort which triggers the obligation to pay damages
under the general principles of Swiss civil law, and specifically under Article 41 ¶ 1 SCO which
provides that “[a]ny person who unlawfully causes loss or damage to another, whether wilfully or
negligently, is obliged to provide compensation.” 225
According to case law, there are three methods to calculate damages resulting from an IP
infringement under Swiss law: 226 the first method requires the showing of an effective or direct
damage (“effektiver oder direkter Schaden” according to the German terminology); the second
method is based on the so-called “license analogy” (“Lizenzanalogie”) and the third method is
based on an analogy to the income of the infringer (“Analogieschluss aus dem Gewinn des
Verletzers”).

223

This is achieved by a reference which is made in the Swiss IP statutes to the Swiss Code of Obligations; for Swiss

patent law, see Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch [ZBG] [Civil Code], SR 232.14, art. 73 ¶ 1 (Switz.) (Swiss Patent
Act) which provides that “[a]ny person who performs an act referred to in Article 66 either wilfully or through
negligence shall be required to pay damages to the injured party according to the provisions of the Code of
Obligations.”

224

Obligationenrecht [OR] [Code of Obligations], SR 220 (Switz.).

225

Id. at art. 41 ¶ 1.

226

BGE 132 III 379 (BGer 2005, ¶ 3.2) (Switz.).
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The first method is based on the showing of an effective or direct damage generally
presupposes to show that the income of the victim has declined as a result of the infringement
activities. 227
The second method—license analogy—means that the infringer has to pay damages which
correspond to the level of royalties that reasonable contracting parties would have agreed upon in
a license agreement. 228 As reflected in case law, the second method aims at assessing the lost
profits of the victim. 229 The victim has the burden to show the damage in the form of lost license
royalties that it has suffered as a result of the IP infringement. The victim must consequently
establish or at least make it probable that it has lost licensing royalties as a result of the infringing
activities. Quite interestingly, the Swiss Federal Court has specified that the amount of the royalties
based on a hypothetical agreement between the licensor and the licensee must be established
without reference to the appropriateness of the royalties: 230 what counts in other terms is the

227

Id. at ¶ 3.2.1.

228

Id. at ¶ 3.2.2 (“The damage quantification using the method of license analogy means that the infringer has to pay

damages to the holder of the intellectual property right in the amount of the remuneration which would have been
agreed upon by reasonable contracting parties when concluding a license agreement for the relevant intellectual
property right.” (translated)) (internal citations omitted).

229

Id. at ¶ 3.4; BGE 97 II 169 (BGer 1971, ¶ 3a) (Switz.).

230

BGE 132 III 379 (BGer 2005, ¶ 3.4) (Switz.) (“However, the application of the method presupposes proof of an

asset reduction for the injured person. If loss of profit is claimed, it must be assumed that the holder of the intellectual
property right should have been able to obtain the lost profit. This is not the case if the holder of the intellectual
property right did not use the intellectual property right at all. Only in so far as the holder of the property right is able
to prove that, as a result of the act of infringement, a license agreement and thus a license fee have probably escaped

354

royalties that the parties would have (subjectively) agreed upon in the relevant circumstances and
not whether such royalties are (objectively) appropriate. 231
The case law of the Swiss Federal Court is however very restrictive so that the method of
license analogy for calculating the damages for IP infringement is extremely difficult to apply
successfully for the victim/IP owner. In the leading case 232, the Swiss Federal Court refused to
award damages for lost royalties in a case in which the IP owner had offered a license for a flat fee
of CHF 90,000 to the infringer and in which the infringer refused such offer and subsequently
started to infringe the patent. In this case, the Swiss Federal Court held that the victim/IP owner
had not established with sufficient probability the damage that it would have suffered, i.e. it had
not established that it could have obtained the license royalties.
The third method—analogy to the income of the infringer—is not based on damage
suffered by the victim but is rather based on the disgorgement of profits made by the infringer 233.
This method is based on Article 423 SCO which provides (in the chapter “Agency without

him, is it a loss of profit. In this case, however, the amount of the license fee shall be determined in accordance with
the hypothetical agreement between the licensor and the licensee, irrespective of the appropriateness of the license
fee.” (translated)) (internal citations omitted).

231

This method evokes the hypothetical negotiation framework of the U.S. Georgia-Pacific framework. In addition,

this approach appears to diverge from the German approach of making an objective determination of royalties based
on objective reasonableness.

232

BGE 132 III 379 (BGer 2005) (Switz.).

233

Id. at ¶ 3.2.3, with reference to BGE 97 II 169 (BGer 1971) (Switz.); BGE 98 II 325 (BGer 1972) (Switz.).
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authority” 234) that “[w]here agency activities were not carried out with the best interests of the
principal in mind, he is nonetheless entitled to appropriate any resulting benefits”.
On this basis and in light of the case law of the Swiss Federal Court defining the calculation
of damages for patent infringement based on the method of the license analogy, monetary damages
for patent infringement based on a license analogy could theoretically be granted even if such
damages are not “appropriate” 235 or reasonable. This could for instance be the case if the patent
owner had successfully negotiated (but not yet signed) a license agreement with a third party with
a very high royalty payment (which might not be appropriate or reasonable by objective standards)
and if the infringing activity had caused such license agreement not to be entered into (for instance
because the negotiating licensee would have stopped the negotiation because of the sudden
appearance of infringing products on the market). If the IP owner could prove such facts with a
sufficient level of probability, it could obtain damages in the amount of the lost royalties even if
such royalties would not be appropriate or reasonable.
As noted above, a FRAND commitment can imply a contractual obligation for the IP owner
for the benefit of the implementers (as third party beneficiaries). The key substantive element of
such commitment is the obligation to license the relevant patents on fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms. On this basis, the first source for defining the meaning of “reasonable” is the
FRAND commitment itself which must be interpreted according to the methods of interpretation
which apply under the law that governs the FRAND commitment (which may make it possible to
take into account other sources which can be relevant for interpreting a contract / a contractual

234

Obligationenrecht [OR] [Code of Obligations], SR 220, art. 419-24 (Switz.).

235

“angemessen”.
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term). Under Swiss contract law, what prevails is the subjective intention of the contracting parties
as reflected in Article 18 ¶ 1 SCO which provides that “[w]hen assessing the form and terms of a
contract, the true and common intention of the parties must be ascertained without dwelling on
any inexact expressions or designations they may have used either in error or by way of disguising
the true nature of the agreement.”
Assuming that Swiss law would apply to a FRAND commitment and that a dispute would
be submitted to a Swiss court in order to decide the royalties to be paid under a FRAND license,
the Swiss court would have to define the term of “reasonable” (as used in the FRAND
commitment) by application of the usual methods of contract interpretation under Swiss contract
law. As a result, a patent owner would have the right to receive FRAND royalties from an
implementer at the level the court would consider “reasonable” based on its interpretation of the
meaning of “reasonable” as used in the FRAND commitment. The Swiss court may in this respect
be inspired to look at sources of international law 236 or of foreign law from which it may be tempted
to draw analogies in order to define the concept of “reasonable” royalties under a FRAND
commitment.
In any event, in contrast to damages for patent infringement based on the method of license
analogy which may diverge from appropriate (or reasonable) royalties (see above), the royalties
due under a FRAND license are in essence supposed to be “reasonable” (or appropriate). On this
basis, it is unlikely that royalties paid under a FRAND license would be the same as monetary

236

Reference could be made to the TRIPS Agreement, art. 31 which provides for a compulsory mechanism

(compulsory licensing of patents) for which similarities may be found with the obligation to license under a FRAND
commitment, under which “the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case,
taking into account the economic value of the authorization” (italics added).
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damages for infringement of the same patent and that “reasonable” royalties for FRAND purposes
shall be the same as standard monetary damages for patent infringement under Swiss patent law
in the scenario in which the FRAND commitment constitutes a valid contractual obligation. This
reflects the difference between a contract-based royalty fee which is supposed to be “reasonable”
under the FRAND framework and a tort-based damage corresponding to a lost royalty fee which
is supposed to compensate the victim for the actual damage that it has suffered, whereby the
damage may not be objectively “reasonable” provided that it can be established that such damage
was incurred / likely to have been incurred.

C.

Korea

Unlike the U.S., the typical measure of damages in Korean patent infringement suits is
“total profits of the infringer” rather than “a reasonable royalty.” And when damages are calculated
in the form of total profits of the alleged infringer, it is difficult to distinguish FRAND committed
SEPs from non-SEPs. This issue arose in Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. v. Apple Korea Ltd.. 237 As
long as total profits of the infringer are concerned, it is difficult for a court to reflect a FRAND
commitment in calculating damages. Even in the case of “total profits of the infringer,” however,
a general principle of remedies law requires the plaintiff to show some causal relation between the
infringer’s profits and the infringement. Accordingly, the amount of actual damages is limited to
the infringer’s total profits which are caused by infringing patents only. Once we take into account
the causal relation between the infringer’s profits and the infringing patents, we have to face a

237

Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. v. Apple Korea Ltd. (Dist. Ct. 2012) (Kor.).
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difficult question of apportionment. The Supreme Court of Korea has struggled to determine what
proportion of the whole product the infringing patents cover in terms of their quantity, quality, and
price. It is difficult to prove the proportional quantity, quality, and price of one out of so many
patents in a multi-component product whether or not the patent is a FRAND committed one.
Theoretically, royalties paid under a FRAND license may be the same as monetary
damages for infringement of the same patent. Unfortunately, however, there is no judicial decision
yet on this issue. As Seoul Central District Court noted in Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. v. Apple
Korea Ltd., it is almost impossible to get enough data on reasonable royalties for FRAND purposes
simply because most licensing agreements are subject to an obligation of confidentiality and
prohibited from disclosure of their terms and conditions. 238

D.

Japan

In Samsung v. Apple Japan, the Japanese IP High Court analyzed the patent infringement
damages to which Samsung was entitled due to Apple’s alleged infringement of Samsung’s SEPs
covering the ETSI UMTS standard. 239 In its decision, the court held that Samsung was entitled to
recover damages from Apple only up to the level of a FRAND royalty. 240 Seeking damages in
excess of a FRAND royalty could constitute an abuse of right unless a SEP holder demonstrates

238

Id.

239

Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Japan LLC (IP High Ct. 2014) (Japan) (FRAND I).

240

Id. at 124-25.
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that the implementer had no intention of obtaining a license on FRAND terms, in which case
damages in excess of the FRAND rate may be available. 241
With respect to the FRAND level of royalties, the court first determined the percentage of
the total value of the infringing products contributed by the UMTS standard. 242 It then determined
that an aggregate royalty rate of 5% should be applied to all patents covering the UMTS standard,
based on an analysis of industry practices and prior royalty commitments made by the parties and
other industry participants. 243 It then found the FRAND royalty for an individual SEP by dividing
the total royalty for UMTS by the number of UMTS SEPs identified by an independent third party
(529 out of the total 1889 SEPs declared to be essential to the standard). 244

E.

China

Thus far, courts in China have rendered judgments in three cases involving FRANDcommitted SEPs. The first was the 2013 decision of the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court in
Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd. v InterDigital Commc’ns, Inc., 245 which involved InterDigital’s portfolio
of Chinese patents essential to the WCDMA, CDMA2000, and TD-SCDMA 3G wireless

241

Id. at 123-24.

242

Id. at 132-33.

243

Id. at 135-36.

244

Id. at 137-38.

245

Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd. v InterDigital Commc’ns, Inc. (Guangdong Higher People’s Ct. Oct. 28, 2013) (China).
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communication standards. After negotiations between the parties failed, Huawei filed two
complaints against InterDigital, one for violation of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, and another
requesting the court to set a FRAND royalty. 246 The court concluded that InterDigital had breached
its obligation to license its patents on FRAND terms and that, based on the royalty rates Samsung
and Apple had paid InterDigital for similar licenses, a FRAND royalty rate for the patents in suit
would be 0.019% of end-product prices. The decision was affirmed on appeal by the Guangdong
High Court. 247
Second, as discussed in Section II.E above, in Iwncomm v. Sony, the Beijing IP court issued
an injunction for the infringement of a FRAND-committed SEP covering the Chinese WAPI
standard relating to wireless networking. 248 In addition, the court issued an award of monetary
damages to Iwncomm, the SEP holder, in the amount of RMB 8,629,173. On the issue of monetary
compensation, according to Shen and Ge:

The court fully adopted Iwncomm’s damages theory, citing the fact that the
invention is a basic invention in the WLAN security field and that Sony was at fault
during the negotiation. The court did not analyse in detail whether the licenses in
evidence are comparable, merely noting that the territorial scope and duration of
these licenses suggest that they can be referred to. Further, despite the fact that

246

Id.

247

Id.

248

For further discussion of Xian Xidian Jietong Wireless Commc’n Co., Ltd. (IWNComm) v. SONY Mobile Commc’n

Prods. (China) Co. Ltd. (Beijing IP Ct. Mar. 22, 2017) (China), Bharadwaj & Verma 2017.
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Iwncomm’s four licenses are all licenses for a portfolio of patents, the court held
that the rate of 1 RMB per unit would be applicable for a single WAPI patent at
issue. 249

The court then (1) multiplied this rate by the number of infringing devices, and (2) trebled the
resulting amount as permitted under Article 21 of China’s Patent Trial Guidelines. 250 So
understood, the decision does not appear to involve a judicial determination of a FRAND royalty
as such, but rather simply a damages award.
Finally, as discussed in Section II.E above, the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court
recently issued an injunction for the infringement of two FRAND-committed patents essential to
the 4G standard in Huawei v. Samsung. 251

249

Shen & Ge 2017.

250

Id.

251

As of this writing, an English-language translation of the January 2018 Huawei v. Samsung decision is not

available, but a summary of the court’s reasoning can be found in Schindler 2018.
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